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Beyond Copyright: Applying a Radical
Idea-Expression Dichotomy to the
Ownership of Fictional Characters
Tze Ping Lim'
ABSTRACT
Copyright protection for fictional characters in the United States
is expanding on an uncertain and incoherent basis. With the event of
the case Towle v. DC Comics, courts have now applied three different
tests to discern a character's copyrightability. Towle was a significant
decision because it was the first time a US court had held that a car (the
Batmobile) was a copyrightable character. Although courts have
utilized the ideas-expression dichotomy to differentiate unprotectable
character 'ideas' from protectable character 'expressions', the dichotomy
is unlikely to alleviate the law's uncertainty and incoherence. Both the
US ideas-expression dichotomy and character copyrightability doctrines
have been highly influenced by the case of Nichols v. Universal Pictures.
In this case, Judge Learned Hand espoused an ideas-expression
dichotomy that expanded copyright to cover more than the literal words
of a text, and so could potentially cover a text's characters. Nevertheless,
Learned Hand admitted that this dichotomy was vague and arbitrary.
This Article combines legal and philosophical perspectives to
shed light on the problems of uncertainty and incoherence in the law of
fictional character ownership. In 1793, the German philosopher Johann
Gottlieb Fichte published a radical ideas-expression dichotomy, wherein
copyright was restricted to the literal words of a text. Under a Fichtean
perspective, fictional characters would be ideas that were beyond
copyright, residing perpetually in the public domain. Although Fichte's
dichotomy was based upon a natural law conception of copyright, a
Law Clerk at Simmonds Stewart, Wellington, New Zealand; Visiting Research Fellow
at the Institute for Interdisciplinary Legal Studies (lucernaiuris), Lucerne, Switzerland (2017);
Conjoint B.A. (Philosophy) and LL.B. (First Class Honors) at Victoria University of Wellington
(2017). The Author would like to thank lucernaiuris for its generous support of her research. The
comments of Dr. Steven Howe, Dr. Deborah Laurs, Dario Haux, and Fabienne Graf on the Article's
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natural law conception of copyright can arguably further utilitarian
goals. This is illustrated by the case study of Friedrich Nicolai's parody
of Johann Wolfgang Goethe's book The Sorrows of Young Werther. This
Article proposes that adopting a Fichtean perspective on fictional
character ownership can enrich our understanding of how fictional
characters can be owned in a copyright sense. If judges adopt language
that more closely reflects Fichte's philosophy, a more detailed analysis
of the facts in character copyrightability cases will likely ensue.
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Owning rights to a fictional character can be a lucrative affair.
Forbes Magazine has reported that "character-based goods brought in
nearly $113 billion worldwide in 2015."1 This figure amounted to nearly
half of the total retail sales of all licensed products recorded by the
Licensing Industry Merchandisers' Association (LIMA), the leading
trade group for the global licensing industry.2 The large amount of
money at stake may explain why owners of fictional characters are
motivated to maximize exclusive control over their characters. Thus,
the question of what it means to own a fictional character becomes a
pressing one for many owners, and also many prospective users of
fictional characters.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently grappled with
this question. In 2011, DC Comics brought a lawsuit against Mark
Towle, a mechanic who made replicas of the Batmobiles featured in the
1960s Batman TV shoW3 and the 1989 Batman movie.4 One cause of
action in the lawsuit was copyright infringement.5 Towle admitted that
he copied the designs of both Batmobiles and deliberately marketed the
cars as Batmobile replicas.6 Towle inter alia argued that the Batmobile
existed in too many inconsistent manifestations to be copyrightable.7
This was not persuasive to the Ninth Circuit. After reviewing the
relevant case law, the Court laid down a new three-part test for
character copyrightability.8 The Court then found that the Batmobile
was a copyrightable character under this test9-ultimately concluding
that Towle had infringed DC Comics' copyright in the Batmobile.10
This was a significant decision because it was the first time that
a US court held that an object could be a copyrightable character."
1. Rob Salkowitz, 2017's Hottest Properties in the $251B Licensing Business, FORBES
(June 29, 2016, 12:28 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robsalkowitz/2016/06/29/at-licensing-
expo-character-is-king/#13 179387 1a3d [https://perma.cc/HQN8-XWQG].
2. Id.; see also About LIMA, LIIMA, https://www.licensing.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/UTD2P-RPB6] (last visited Sept. 15, 2018).
3. DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2015); see generally Batman (ABC 1966-
1968) (starring Adam West as Bruce Wayne or Batman).
4. BATMAN (Warner Bros. Pictures 1989) (starring Michael Keaton as Bruce Wayne or
Batman).
5. Towle, 802 F.3d at 1017.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1022.
8. Id. at 1021.
9. Id. at 1022.
10. Id. at 1027.
11. See id. Previously, courts generally held that a car could be copyrightable, provided
that other requirements were met. See, e.g., Halicki Films, LLC v. Sanderson Sales & Mktg., 547
972018]
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Characters previously found to be copyrightable have had, at the very
least, some sort of sentient personality. Aside from Batman,12 such
copyrightable characters have included Godzilla1 3 and Jonathan
Livingston Seagull.14
In some ways, the decision was not surprising. Batman may be
an iconic American superhero with over seventy-five years of comic book
history,15 but his primary means of transport-the Batmobile-has also
become a pop culture icon in its own right.16 Evidence of this iconic
status includes the fact that the armored twenty-foot vehicle designed
for Batman v. Superman17 attracted substantial media interest in the
lead up to the film's premiere.18 However, it is worth noting that the
Batmobile has greatly evolved over the years. In 1941, the Batmobile
first appeared in Detective Comics #48 as a red sedan with a bat-shaped
hood ornament.19 Nowadays, the Batmobile is more often recognized as
a sleek, black or grey car that is equipped with bat-themed features and
a range of high-tech mechanisms.20 The Batmobiles from the 1960s
television show and the 1989 movie look quite different.21 It can be hard
F.3d 1213, 1225 (9th Cir. 2008) (examining the car "Eleanor" from Gone in 60 Seconds on a pre-
trial basis).
12. Sapon v. DC Comics, No. 00 CIV. 8992, 2002 WL 485730, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29,
2002).
13. Toho v. William Morrow & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1218 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
14. Bach v. Forever Living Prods., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1139 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
15. Marc Graser, Batman Turns 75, Gets Big Birthday Bash from WB, DC, VARIETY (Mar.
27, 2014, 4:29 PM), https://variety.com/2014/biz/news/batman-turns- 75-gets-big-birthday-bash-
from-wb-dc-1201149261/ [https://perma.cclD47K-Q3P7].
16. MICHAEL L. BERGER, THE AUTOMOBILE IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND CULTURE: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 229 (2011) (referring to "those vehicles themselves that achieve a degree of
stardom, such as the Batmobile"); VINCENT LOBRUTTO, TV IN THE USA: A HISTORY OF ICONS,
IDOLS, AND IDEAS, 1950S-1960s 176 (2018).
17. BATMAN V SUPERMAN: DAWN OF JUSTICE (Warner Bros. Pictures 2016) (starring Ben
Affleck as Bruce Wayne or Batman).
18. See, e.g., Bozi Tatarevic, Batmobile Starring in 'Batman v Superman' Is a 205-MPH
Beast, MOTOR AUTHORITY (June 11, 2015),
https://www.motorauthority.com/news/1098686-batmobile-starring-in-batman-v-superman-is-a-
205-mph-beast [https://perma.cc[HYR8-TVX2]; see also Doug Ganley, New Batmobile Is Armed
and Ready, CNN (Sept. 11, 2014, 5:56 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/11/showbiz/movies/
batmobile-zack-snyder-batman-v-superman/index.htm1 [https://perma.cclH2HE-YR57]; Joseph C.
Lin, See the First Full Photo of the Batmobile From Batman vs. Superman, TIME (Sept. 11, 2014),
http://time.com/3318662/first-photo-batmobile-batman-vs-superman-zack-snyder/
[https://perma.cc/2ARH-ZDKQ]; Jane Wells, Want Your Own Batmobile? Here's What It Costs,
CNBC (Sept. 23, 2014, 4:19 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/09/23/new-batman-movie-want-your-
own-batmobile-heres-what-it-costs.html [https://perma.cclP9VQ-K9RV].
19. Bob Kane, Batman with Robin the Boy Wonder, DETECTIVE COMICS 48 (DC Comics
1941); see also Sidney Fussell, The 75-Year Evolution of the Batmobile, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 3, 2016,
5:20 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/batmobile-evolution-2016-3 [https://perma.cc/9LYV-
3BC2].
20. See Fussell, supra note 19.
21. Compare, for example, the Batmobile used in the 1960s TV Show (black coupe with
orange trimming) and the Batmobile used in the 1989 Batman movie (armored black vehicle, no
98
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to discern exactly what Batmobile was being copyrighted in Towle,
given the differences among the Batmobiles put forward by DC
Comics. 22
Towle is the latest in a web of tangled cases that address the
copyright protection of fictional characters.23 The web's genesis lies in
the Second Circuit's decision Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,
wherein Judge Learned Hand in obiter entertained the possibility of
copyright protection for a fictional character, independently of works in
which that character appeared.24 Subsequent courts developed his
comments into the first test for character copyrightability, called the
"sufficiently delineated" test.25 Later, remarks from the Ninth Circuit's
decision Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. CBS, Inc. were applied as a
second copyrightability test, known as the "story being told" test.2 6
Today, courts tend to favor applying the sufficiently delineated test.2 7
However, case law has been inconsistent as to whether and to what
extent the story being told test can still be applied-especially in
relation to characters portrayed textually.28 As commentators have
persistently complained over the past sixty years, the law on fictional
character ownership is uncertain and incoherent.29 Towle's test for
trimming). Photos of the two cars can be found in Thomas Huthwaite, To the Batmobile, Let's Go!
A Review of Copyrightable Subject Matter, BALDWINS (Oct. 9, 2015),
https://www.baldwins.com/news/to-the-batmobile-lets-go-a-review-of-copyrightable-subject-
matter [https://perma.cc/YRW7-98FB]
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Part II.
24. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
25. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954).
27. See AARON SCHWABACH, FAN FICTION AND COPYRIGHT: OUTSIDER WORKS AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 33 (2011) ("Even within the Ninth Circuit, the 'story being
told' test is now viewed warily.").
28. See infra Section II.C.
29. See, e.g., SCHWABACH, supra note 27, at 44 (noting that the place where the line is
drawn between protected and unprotected characters "remains unclear"); E. Fulton Brylawski,
Protection of Characters - Sam Spade Revisited, 22 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 77, 77 (1974)
(describing the legal doctrines surrounding character copyright as "rather inconsistent, unclear
and quixotic"); Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 WIS. L.
REV. 429, 437 (1986) (stating that courts have applied legal doctrines "inconsistently" and so it
was "difficult to predict what elements of a character will be protected"); Michael V. P. Marks, The
Legal Rights of Fictional Characters, 25 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 35, 36 (1975) (describing the law as
"unclear and inconsistent"); Zahr K. Said, Fixing Copyright in Characters: Literary Perspectives on
a Legal Problem, 35 CARDOzO L. REV. 769, 772 (2013) ("[T]he law in this area is very unclear.");
Kathryn M. Foley, Note, Protecting Fictional Characters: Defining the Elusive Trademark-
Copyright Divide, 41 CONN. L. REV. 921, 926 (2009) ("The development of copyright protection for
fictional characters has been riddled with uncertainty and inconsistency. . . ."); Kenneth E. Spahn,
Comment, The Legal Protection of Fictional Characters, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 331,
331 (1992) ("[Fictional characters] still do not enjoy well defined legal protection against
infringement.").
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character copyrightability30 is unlikely to provide adequate remedy for
the law's problems.31 Instead, the courts need better rules for drawing
the boundary lines of character copyrightability and better reasoning
for supporting such rules.
These boundary lines are especially important considering that
the constitutional objective of copyright is to promote the arts.32 This
utilitarian rationale for copyright forms the framework from which
courts interpret the principles that define the boundaries of copyright.33
Copyright grants authors exclusive rightS34 so that they have incentives
to create works of art;3 5 however, those rights are limited36 to allow the
public to access and build upon those works.37 Inherent in copyright is
an attempt to carefully balance the need for protecting copyrighted
works against the need to allow public access to those works.38 Simply
put, there can be a concern that overprotection strangles access, whilst
underprotection jeopardizes incentives to create. The law's trend
towards increased copyright protection for fictional characters suggests
a possibility of overprotection.3 9 Boundary lines are needed to strike a
proper balance between underprotection and overprotection.
One copyright principle that has been said to define the
copyright boundary and limit the scope of copyright is the idea-
expression dichotomy. Codified in statute, the idea-expression
dichotomy provides that copyright only protects the expression of ideas,
30. Towle, 802 F.3d at 1021.
31. See infra Part II.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
33. See, e.g., Ladd v. Law & Tech. Press, 762 F.3d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1985).
34. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
35. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) ("By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.").
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (limiting copyright through
a duration term).
37. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("[T]he ultimate
aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good."); see also Feist
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) ("[Copyright] encourages others
to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.").
38. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (discussing the "inherent
tension in the need simultaneously to protect copyrighted material and to allow others to build
upon it"); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) ("Striking the correct balance between access and incentives
is the central problem in copyright law."); Mary W. S. Wong, "Transformative" User-Generated
Content in Copyright Law: Infringing Derivative Works or Fair Use?, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
1075, 1138 (2009) (recognizing the current copyright balance and urging the of consideration of a
system that regards "both authors and users (who are sometimes one and the same) as equal and
integrated members").
39. See infra Part II.
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BEYOND COPYRIGHT
not the ideas themselves.40 US courts have relied on this dichotomy in
the past to define the boundaries of character copyrightability,
distinguishing unprotectable character ideas from protectable
character expressions.41 However, the idea-expression dichotomy has
been subject to trenchant criticism for setting a vague and arbitrary
standard.42 Hence, applying the dichotomy to fictional characters may
not assist in achieving clarity and certainty in the law of character
copyrightability. This proposition becomes more tenable upon
reexamining the case that was key to developing both the idea-
expression dichotomy and character copyrightability in the United
States: Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.43 In this case, Judge
Learned Hand espoused an idea-expression dichotomy that expanded
copyright to cover more than the literal words of the text, and
entertained the possibility of copyrightable characters.44 Although
Judge Learned Hand admitted the dichotomy was vague and arbitrary,
he also argued that this dichotomy was essential to copyright law.4 5
Long before Towle and Nichols were decided-and indeed before
copyright even existed in most countries-the German philosopher
Johann Gottlieb Fichte published his article, Proof of the Unlawfulness
of Reprinting, in 1793.46 Through distinguishing a book's "content" from
its "form," Fichte espoused a radical idea-expression dichotomy wherein
copyright was restricted to the literal words of the text.47 Ideas were to
be owned as common property, whilst expression could be owned as
40. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879) (holding that
neither blank accounting books nor methods of accounting were copyrightable).
41. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation
omitted) ("[W]hile many literary characters may embody little more than an unprotected idea, a
comic book character, which has physical as well as conceptual qualities, is more likely to contain
some unique elements of expression."); Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 950
(9th Cir. 1954) (stating that if the character is not the "story being told," he is not in the subject
area of copyright protection); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d. 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)
("[A] vain and foppish steward who became amorous of his mistress ... would be no more than
Shakespeare's 'idea[' .... .").
42. Richard H. Jones, The Myth of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 10
PACE L. REV. 551, 552 (1990); Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law,
56 TENN. L. REV. 321, 323 (1989).
43. Nichols, 45 F.2d. at 121.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 122.
46. See generally Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Beweis der Unrechtmdfigkeit des
Bdichernachdrucks, 21 BERLINISCHE MONATSCHRIFT 443 (1793), translated in Proof of the
Unlawfulness of Reprinting, in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450-1900) (Lionel Bently &
Martin Kretschmer eds., Martha Woodmansee trans.),
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRepresentation?id=representationd_179
3&pagenumber=11&show=translation [https://perma.cc/JYH8-9RLJ] (last visited Sept. 25,
2018).
47. Id. at 447, 453, 468.
2018] 101
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exclusive property.48 Fichte's dichotomy was based upon a presumption
relating to the uniqueness of a person's learning process,49 and the
dichotomy itself formed the natural law foundations for Fichte's system
of copyright.50 The German philosopher's ystem of copyright both
foreshadowed and diverged from the current copyright system in the
United States.51
This Article proposes that considering a Fichtean perspective on
fictional character ownership can enrich our understanding of how
fictional characters can be owned in a copyright sense.52 A Fichtean
perspective entails viewing fictional characters as ideas, unable to be
owned by anyone as exclusive property.53 Once published, fictional
characters ought to reside in the public domain as common property.
Conversely, what people can own exclusively are their expressions of
fictional characters. Copyright infringement is limited to more or less
exact copying. If a Fichtean perspective is applied to the law of
character copyrightability, many of the law's current problems of
uncertainty and incoherence could be avoided. Furthermore, although
a natural law conception of copyright may seem at odds with a
utilitarian conception, it is plausible that applying a natural law
conception can still help bring about the consequences ought after by
a utilitarian conception.54 A concrete example of this point can be found
in 1793, when the German writer Friedrich Nicolai appropriated
characters from Johann Wolfgang Goethe's book The Sorrows of Young
Werther5 5 to write his parody, The Joys of Young Werther.56 Goethe's
reaction illustrated what could happen if a Fichtean perspective on
fictional characters is put into practice-the creation of more art.5 7
48. Id. at 450-51.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 460-61 (referring to an author's ownership of his expression as his "natural,
inborn, and inalienable right of ownership").
51. See infra Part III.
52. See infra Part IV.
53. See infra Section IV.A.
54. See infra Part V.
55. See generally JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, DIE LEIDEN DES JUNGEN WERTHERS
(1774) [hereinafter GOETHE (1774)]. The 1774 edition is rare and only available in German, but it
is the edition that Nicolai would have copied. I have translated quotes from the 1774 edition with
reference to Carlyle and Boylan's translation of the more widely circulated 1787 edition: JOHANN
WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, DIE LEIDEN DES JUNGEN WERTHERS (1787), translated in THE SORROWS
OF YOUNG WERTHER (Nathan Haskell Dole ed., Thomas Carlyle & R.D. Boylan trans., Dover Thrift
2002) [hereinafter GOETHE].
56. See generally FRIEDRICH NiCOLAI, FREUDEN DES JUNGEN WERTHERS (1775),
translated in The Joys of Young Werther, INTRANSLATION (Margaret Hiley trans., 2017),
www.intranslation.brooklynrail.org [https://perma.cc/DA9X-ZEKB] (forthcoming 2018) (on file
with author).
57. See infra Section V.D.
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Academics have recognized the need to adopt broad cross-
disciplinary approaches when assessing and critiquing copyright law.5 8
In Professor Zahr K. Said's 2013 article, Fixing Copyright: Literary
Perspectives on a Legal Problem, she argued for "the benefits of an
interdisciplinary approach to the problem of copyright's internal
inconsistencies."59 In her article, Said observed that the copyright
conception of character was significantly different from the literary
conception of character.60 If the literary conception was utilized, this
pointed against inter alia owning fictional characters as independent
copyrighted works.61 The subsequent Parts both build upon Professor
Said's more specific research in relation to fictional characters and
support her wider push for cross-disciplinary research. This Article's
objective is not so much widespread copyright reform, but rather a call
to view fictional character ownership in a different way. That call has
been expressed through presenting a philosophical perspective on the
matter from eighteenth century Germany, where characters were not
copyrightable, and copyright itself was yet to be legislated.
This Article starts in Part II by giving readers an overview of US
copyright law and the legal ownership of fictional characters,
highlighting problems of the law's uncertainty and incoherence. Part
III then describes the philosopher Fichte's idea-expression dichotomy
in precopyright Germany and compares his system of copyright to the
current system of copyright in the United States. Part IV applies
Fichte's philosophy to construct a Fichtean perspective on fictional
character ownership and uses it to illustrate how such a perspective can
avoid the legal problems discussed in Part II. Part V illustrates the
Fichtean perspective in practice through examining Nicolai's
appropriation of Goethe's characters, thereby also showing how a
natural law conception of copyright can complement a utilitarian
conception. Part VI discusses the implications of this Article's research,
proposing the judiciary adopt language that better reflects Fichte's
philosophy. Part VII provides the conclusion.
58. See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, The Interdisciplinary Future of Copyright Theory, 10 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 423, 436 (1992); Said, supra note 29, at 772. See generally Landes & Posner,
supra note 38 (examining copyright law through an economic lens).
59. Said, supra note 29, at 773-74.
60. Id. at 774.
61. Id. at 827.
2018] 103
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II. PROBLEMS IN THE LANDSCAPE OF FICTIONAL CHARACTER
OWNERSHIP
A. Overview of Current Law
As previously discussed, the US Constitution defines the
purpose of copyright in utilitarian terms, with copyright's stated
purpose being to "promote the progress of science and useful arts."62
Section 102 of the Copyright Act defines the statutory scope of the
subject matter of copyright.63 Subsection (a) provides that copyright
subsists in "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
of expression" and subsection (b) provides that copyright protection does
not extend to the ideas "embodied" in protected copyrighted works.64
From this, courts have derived at least four doctrines that help to draw
the primary boundaries of copyright law: originality, fixation, works of
authorship, and the idea-expression dichotomy.65
Generally speaking, the first owner of a copyrighted work is the
work's author.66 Copyright's grant of exclusive rights is broad and
includes the right to reproduce the work67 as well as the right to make
derivative works such as a translation or adaptation.68 Copyright
infringement occurs when someone has made an unauthorized copy of
the owner's work, and the two works are substantially similar.69 One
exception to infringement is a person's fair use of a copyrighted work.70
The Copyright Act gives a nonexhaustive list of what works of
authorship are.71 The list includes literary, pictorial, and graphic works
as well as motion pictures and other audio-visual works.72 As a result,
there are two main ways that a person can own copyright in a fictional
character in the United States.
First, a person may own copyright in a work that falls within the
enumerated statutory list. Fictional characters contained in the work
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
63. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
64. Id.
65. See generally Joseph P. Liu, What Belongs in Copyright, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 325
(2016). Note however, that Liu implicitly categorizes the idea-expression dichotomy as a corollary
of the originality principle, and instead focuses more attention on the definition of author as a
limiting principle of copyright. Id. at 326, 329.
66. § 201(a) ("Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author
or authors of the work.").
67. § 106.
68. Id.; see also § 101 (defining the term "derivative work").






may be protected as part of the work.7 3 For example, in SunTrust Bank
v. Houghton Mifflin Co., the Eleventh Circuit was tasked with
reviewing the district court's granting of a preliminary injunction to the
plaintiff SunTrust Bank.74 It was undisputed that SunTrust Bank
owned copyright in the literary work Gone with the Wind.75 On its own
review, the court also found that the defendant's book-The Wind Done
Gone,76 a parody of Gone with the Wind-had made "substantial use" of
Gone with the Wind, having appropriated "numerous characters,
settings, and plot twists" from the original book.77 Hence, the Court
accepted that for the purposes of applying for a preliminary injunction,
the plaintiff had established the defendant's prima facie copyright
infringement of Gone with the Wind.78 The defendant's character
appropriation contributed to that conclusion.79 However, the Eleventh
Circuit ultimately decided that it seemed like the defendant had a
"viable fair use defense," and so reversed the district court's decision,
remanding the case for further proceedings.80
The second way a person may own copyright in a fictional
character in the United States is through directly owning copyright in
the character itself-independently of owning any of the works in which
the character appears. For ease of reference, this Article will
subsequently refer to this capacity of owning a character as an
"independent copyrighted work." As no statute explicitly recognizes
fictional characters as a type of work of authorship, legal authority for
this proposal comes from case law.81 Unfortunately, contradictory case
law exists, making it hard to state general principles of law.82 However,
courts have, so far, held that fictional characters appearing in graphical
73. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1266-67 (11th Cir.
2001).
74. Id. at 1260.
75. Id. at 1266. See generally MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (1936).
76. ALICE RANDALL, THE WIND DONE GONE (2001).
77. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d. at 1267.
78. Id. at 1265-67.
79. Id. at 1267.
80. Id. at 1277.
81. See Nicole J. O'Hara, The Arc and Art of Protecting Fictional Characters, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 2, 2018, 9:40 AM), https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/
2018/04/02/
the-arc-and-art-of-protecting-fictional-characters/ [https://perma.cc/YH49-VLAX]; see, e.g.,
Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ'ns, Inc., 111 F.2d 432, 433-34 (2d Cir.1940) (holding that the
character Superman is protected by copyright independent of the works in which he appears).
82. See infra Section II.B.
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works,83 literary works,84 and also audio-visual works85 can be protected
by copyright-independently of the works in which the characters
appear.
The ability to own a character as an independent copyrighted
work is most significant in situations where a second-comer copies an
author's character, but the copying does not reach the threshold of
"substantial similarity."8 6 This generally occurs when the second-comer
has put the author's character in a context or plot that departs from the
author's source work.87  Towle provides a good example of this
situation.88 By making Batmobile replicas, Mark Towle had essentially
decontextualized the Batmobile from the fictional settings and
narratives of the Batman films. As a result, it is understandable why
DC Comics did not allege Towle infringed copyright in the Batman
films, because Towle's replicas would not have reached the threshold of
being substantially similar to any of the Batman films. However,
because the court found that the Batmobile itself was copyrightable, it
was then easier to find that Towle's replicas were substantially similar
copies and therefore infringing.89
Although it is now settled that fictional characters can be
copyrightable, the questions of when a fictional character will be
copyrightable or when copying a fictional character will constitute
copyright infringement have far from steady answers. Courts have
found it difficult to discern whether a fictional character is an
unprotectable idea or a protectable expression.90 They have also
struggled with ascertaining whether a defendant has only copied the
83. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 757-58 (9th Cir. 1978)
(holding that various comic book Disney characters including Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck
were copyrightable); Detective Comics, 111 F.2d 432, 433-34 (holding that comic book character
Superman was copyrightable).
84. See, e.g., Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 2014)
(holding that the literary characters Sherlock Holmes and John Watson were copyrightable);
Burroughs v. MGM, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 388, 391 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the literary character
Tarzan was copyrightable).
85. See, e.g., DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012, 1022 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the
Batmobile, as portrayed in comics and movies, was a copyrightable character); MGM, Inc. v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that the James Bond movie
character was copyrightable); Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *6
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989) (holding that various primary and secondary characters from the Rocky
movies were copyrightable).
86. See, e.g., Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1073 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing
substantial similarity); see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.03 (Mattew Bender rev. ed. 2018) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
87. See Said, supra note 29, at 776-80.
88. Towle, 802 F.3d at 1017.
89. Id. at 1025-26.
90. See infra Section II.C.
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idea of a fictional character or when expression has been copied.9 1
Lastly, some courts have also treated characters portrayed through text
(literary characters) differently from how they have treated characters
portrayed through graphical images (graphical characters) and audio-
visual media (audio-visual characters).92 The resulting case law is
inconsistent, resulting in legal uncertainty. Furthermore, judicial
reasoning has also been incoherent, making it difficult to deduce any
general principles of law.
B. Legal Uncertainty
Courts have applied three different tests to determine the
independent copyrightability of a fictional character:
1. The sufficiently delineated test from Nichols93
2. The story being told test from Warner Bros.94
3. The three-part test from Towle95
The sufficiently delineated test-the first test applied by the
courts-requires that a character must be "sufficiently delineated" in
order to be protected by copyright.96 The test's wording is derived from
the comments of Judge Learned Hand in Nichols who stated that "the
less developed the characters, the less they can be copyrighted; that is
the penalty an author must bear for marking them too indistinctly."9 7
The test seems to favor well-developed characters, especially if they
have been developed over multiple works.98 It has been applied to
successfully to protect characters including Mickey Mouse,99 James
91. See infra Section II.C.
92. See infra Section II.C.
93. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
94. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954).
95. DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012, 1021 (9th Cir. 2015). So far, the three-part test
has only been applied in Towle. Id.
96. See, e.g., Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ'ns, 111 F.2d 432, 433 (2d Cir. 1940) ("So
far as the pictorial representations and verbal descriptions of 'Superman' are not a mere
delineation of a benevolent Hercules, but embody an arrangement of incidents and literary
expressions original with the author, they are proper subjects of copyright . . . "); see also Burtis v.
Universal Pictures Co., 256 P.2d 933, 941 (Cal. 1953) ("Although it might be possible that an
author could so carefully delineate a character as to secure a protectible property interest in that
character, . . . [h]ere there has been no such careful development of characterizations." (citations
omitted)); Marks, supra note 29, at 41-42, 49.
97. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
98. See SCHWABACH, supra note 27, at 44-45.
99. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 757-58 (9th Cir. 1978)
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Bond,100 and Tarzan,101 as well as many characters from the Rocky
movies.102 A line, however, was drawn in Rice v. Fox Broadcasting Co.,
where the court held that a magician in a home video was not
copyrightable.103 The court reasoned that a magician "dressed in
standard magician garb" and whose role was "limited to performing and
revealing the magic tricks" was not "especially distinct."104
The second test applied by courts is the story being told test. In
order to be copyrightable, the character must constitute "the story being
told." In other words, "[I]f the character is only the chessman in the
game of telling the story he is not within the area of the protection
afforded by the copyright."105 Although seen as more restrictive than
the sufficiently delineated test,106 the story being told test has also been
successfully applied to protect characters including James Bond107 and
many characters from the Rocky movies.108  However, even the
protagonists of novels have failed this test. In Warner Bros., the court
found that Sam Spade did not pass the test even though he was the
protagonist of The Maltese Falcon.109 Unsurprisingly, the magician
character in Rice failed the story being told test as well.110
Until Towle, the sufficiently delineated and story being told tests
were the only standards applied by courts to discern character
copyrightability, and courts have struggled with both tests.111 For
example, in Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, the Ninth Circuit
declined to apply the story being told test, referencing its application to
literary characters, and applied the sufficiently delineated test to the
graphical characters at issue (i.e., Mickey Mouse).112 Yet, in Gaiman v.
McFarlane, the Seventh Circuit stated that the Warner Bros. decision
regarding Sam Spade and applying the story being told test was
100. MGM, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1302 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
101. Burroughs v. MGM, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 388, 391 (2d Cir. 1981).
102. Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25,
1989).
103. Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003).
104. Id.
105. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954).
106. See, e.g., SCHWABACH, supra note 27, at 31.
107. MGM, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
108. Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25,
1989).
109. Warner Bros. Pictures, 216 F.2d at 950; see generally DASHIELL HAMMETT, THE
MALTESE FALCON (1930).
110. Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2003).
111. For a detailed discussion of the case law in relation to the story being told test until
2011, see SCHWABACH, supra note 27, at 28-45.
112. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Because comic
book characters therefore are distinguishable from literary characters, the Warner Brothers
language does not preclude protection of Disney's characters.").
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"wrong," and it had been "killed" by the Ninth Circuit.113 Nevertheless,
courts outside the Seventh Circuit have occasionally applied the story
being told test in conjunction with the sufficiently delineated test to
audio-visual characters. For example, at least two Ninth Circuit
District Courts applied both tests to find James Bond1 14 and characters
from the Rocky movies15 copyrightable in the context of considering
motions for an injunction and summary judgment, respectively. Most
recently, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
applied the sufficiently delineated test to find the literary character
Holden Caulfield copyrightable;11 6 however, the court did not mention
the story being told test in its judgment.117 These cases are but a
sampling of the messy state of affairs that existed at the time Towle
was decided.
In Towle, the court's review of the case law led it to conclude that
precedent had established a "three-part est for determining whether a
character in a comic book, television program, or motion picture is
entitled to copyright protection." 18 The three parts are as follows:
1. "[T]he character must generally have 'physical as well as
conceptual qualities."'
2. "[T]he character must be 'sufficiently delineated' to be
recognizable as the same character whenever it appears.
Consider the character as it has appeared in different
productions, it must display consistent, identifiable character
traits and attributes, although the character need not have a
consistent appearance."
3. "[T]he character must be 'especially distinctive' and 'contain
some unique elements of expression."'l1 9
The test has, so far, only been applied in Towle, wherein the
court held that the Batmobile passed the test.120 It is easy enough to
see the three-part test as an evolution of the sufficiently delineated
113. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Walt Disney Prods.,
581 F.2d 751 and Olson v. National Broadcasting Co., 855 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988)).
114. MGM, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1296-97 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
115. Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25,
1989).
116. Salinger v. Colting, 2d 641 250, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff'd in relevant part, Salinger v.
Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 2010). Holden Caulfield is the main character from The Catcher
in the Rye. J.D. SALINGER, THE CATCHER IN THE RYE. (1951).
117. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 69.
118. DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012, 1021 (9th Cir. 2015).
119. Id. (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 1022.
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Nichols test, given its citing of previous cases21 and phrasing like
"sufficiently delineated."122 However, the three-part test explicitly
applies only to graphic and audio-visual characters, seemingly leaving
literary characters out.1 2 3 In contrast, the sufficiently delineated test
has been applied to literary characters like Holden Caulfield.124 This
seems to distinguish the three-part test from the sufficiently delineated
test.
Unfortunately, which test applies to literary characters remains
unclear.125 The Ninth Circuit in Towle neglected to address the story
being told test. During its review of case law, the Ninth Circuit simply
stated that in Air Pirates, "we distinguished a prior decision suggesting
that literary 'characters ordinarily are not copyrightable,' on the
grounds that a comic book character 'has physical as well as conceptual
qualities' and 'is more likely to contain some unique elements of
expression than a purely literary character."'126 Thus, it is unclear
whether the story being told test should apply to literary characters or
whether some new standard, also comprising of an evolution from the
sufficiently delineated test, needs to be laid down for literary
characters. In short, the case law on fictional characters has been
continuously unclear and is likely to remain unclear in the near future.
C. Legal Incoherence
Clarity will not necessarily come if the courts choose any one of
the above-mentioned tests as the only test to apply to fictional
characters-whether literary, audio-visual, or graphical-because ach
test contains elements of incoherence.
The story being told test has been criticized for being "somewhat
unintelligible," especially given that Warner Bros., the case which
created this test, failed Sam Spade even though he was the protagonist
of the story at issue.127 In Air Pirates, the court attempted to explain
Warner Bros.'outcome by distinguishing between literary and graphical
characters. The court intriguingly referenced the idea-expression
dichotomy: "[W]hile many literary characters may embody little more
121. See, e.g., id. at 1019-21.
122. Id. at 1019, 1021.
123. See id. at 1021.
124. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 2010).
125. See Missy G. Brenner, Comment, Shadow of the Bat[Mobile]: Character Copyright
after DC Comics v. Towle, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 481, 508 (2017); Katherine Alphonso, Note, DC
Comics v. Towle: To the Batmobile!: Which Fictional Characters Deserve Protection Under
Copyright Law, 47 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 5, 18, 22 (2017).
126. See Towle, 802 F.3d at 1019.
127. Brylawski, supra note 29, at 87, 92-93.
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than an unprotected idea, a comic book character, which has physical
as well as conceptual qualities, is more likely to contain some unique
elements of expression."128 This line of reasoning was continued by
Judge Posner in Gaiman v. McFarlane, who reasoned that while "[a]
reader of unillustrated fiction completes the work in his mind; the
reader of a comic book or the viewer of a movie is passive."1 29 However,
using this line of reasoning may lead to an aesthetic bias in copyright
protection, where graphical characters are more likely to be protected
than literary characters.130 This, in turn, seems to be at odds with
Bleistein v. Donaldson Litographing Co.'s holding that courts should
avoid basing the test for copyright subsistence on aesthetic
judgements.131
Furthermore, even assuming post-Towle that the sufficiently
delineated test will continue to apply, whether as a standalone test or
as the first part of Towle's three-part test, problems will still arise. In
Burroughs v. MGM, Inc., the court found that the literary character
Tarzan was sufficiently delineated.132 In justification, Judge Werker
stated, "Tarzan is the ape-man. He is an individual closely in tune with
his jungle environment, able to communicate with animals yet able to
experience human emotions. He is athletic, innocent, youthful, gentle
and strong. He is Tarzan."133 The response of critic Aaron Schwabach
is apt; he asked, "What, really, does that tell us about Tarzan?"134
Schwabach went on to describe other protagonists of adventure films
with Tarzan's traits, such as Rudyard Kipling's Mowgli.1 35
This reasonably abstract and generalized manner of character
description also occurred in Towle, wherein the Ninth Circuit applied
its three-part test to the Batmobile.136 The court found that the
Batmobile was "sufficiently delineated," having "maintained distinct
physical and conceptual qualities" since its first comic book
appearance.137  These qualities included its status as a "highly-
interactive vehicle, equipped with high-tech gadgets and weaponry
used to aid Batman in fighting crime," and being "almost always bat-
like in appearance ... even though the precise nature of the bat-like
128. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).
129. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
130. Said, supra note 29, at 813; see also Brylawski, supra note 29, at 83-84.
131. Said, supra note 29, at 805 (citing Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.
239, 251 (1903)).
132. Burroughs v. MGM, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 388, 391 (2d Cir. 1981).
133. Id.
134. SCHWABACH, supra note 27, at 26.
135. Id.
136. DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 2015).
137. Id. at 1021.
2018] 111
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
characteristics have changed from time to time."138 The Ninth Circuit
then cited specific examples of these characteristics from various
Batman comic books, as well as a television series and film. 13 9
Towle pointed out occasions where the Batmobile appeared
without bat-like features, such as when the Batmobile appeared as a
heavily armored tank in a 1988 comic book.140 However, the court
rejected Towle's argument.141 To the Ninth Circuit, such changes
"resemble[d] costume changes that do not alter the Batmobile's innate
characteristics, any more than James Bond's change from blue
swimming trunks (in Casino Royale) to his classic tuxedo affects his
iconic character."142 Hence, the court ultimately had to describe the
Batmobile at a high level of abstraction in order to excuse the
Batmobile's "costume changes."143 This gave rise to repeated criticism
from commentators that the court seemed to protect an idea and not an
expression, particularly due to the large inconsistences between various
cited portrayals of the Batmobile.144
Using such generalized, abstract language seems to greatly
expand the scope of a fictional character on a vague, notional basis. For
example, MGM, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co. involved defendant
Honda's intended use of a blonde male character driving a car in an
advertisement. 145 The blonde character's passenger was an attractive
young woman, and, in the intended advertisement, their conversation
was interrupted by a nemesis appearing to apprehend the duo in a
helicopter.146 As in many James Bond films, the blonde male character
effortlessly disposed of the nemesis.147 The court held that the plaintiff,
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. (MGM), was likely to own copyright in the
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1021-22.




144. Brenner, supra note 125, at 499 ("The problem is that in the court's identification of
certain traits that shape a character, the original character is reduced nearly to an idea, losing the
nuances that might differentiate it from the allegedly infringing work."); Huthwaite, supra note
21 ("Judge Ikuta comes close to defining the Batmobile as an idea that can be expressed in any
number of ways."); Mike Masnick, Appeals Court Says the Batmobile is a 'Character' Covered by
Copyright, TECHDIRT (Sept. 24, 2015, 5:34 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150923/15591132350/appeals-court-says-batmobile-is-
character-covered-copyright.shtml [https://perma.cc/RRL3-FDW5].
145. See MGM, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1291, n.15 (C.D. Cal.
1995). The advertisement can still be found online at ibpimin, Honda Del Sol Commercial,
YOUTUBE (June 27, 2006), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-gqa-b3assCA
[https://perma.cc/J72Z-CT3M].
146. See MGM, 900 F. Supp. at 1291; see also ibpimin, supra note 145, at 0:26.
147. See MGM, 900 F. Supp. at 1291; see also ibpimin, supra note 145, at 0:45.
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fictional character James Bond.148 Another issue was whether there
was substantial similarity between the two characters, such that
infringement was likely and provided grounds for ordering of a
preliminary injunction.149 In sum, the court found that infringement
was likely.150 In Schwabach's review of the case, he made the incisive
remark that "[w]hile the basic aspects-couple in a car, pursuing
helicopter, weird villain, quip after casually defeating villain-can be
found in the James Bond movies, they can also be found throughout the
action movie genre."s15 In other words, when characters are described
in such abstract fashions, it soon becomes too easy to include an entire
genre, whether action or jungle orientated, into the scope of a single
character.
The case law trend, prima facie, seems to be a general expansion
of copyright protection for fictional characters. Starting with Judge
Learned Hand's openness to the copyrightability of fictional characters
in 1930,152 copyright was then found to subsist in the comic book
character Superman in 1940.153 Although it seemed that, at first,
copyright protection would be denied for literary characters, in later
years it appeared that this was no longer the case. This was exemplified
by the Second Circuit's acceptance of copyright in the literary character
Holden Caulfield in 2011.154 Most recently, Towle's holding that the
Batmobile was a copyrightable character further increased the scope of
fictional characters that can be copyrighted.155
Increased copyright protection is not necessarily a bad thing.
However, given copyright's utilitarian purpose,156 copyright should only
be strengthened so far as it will help to promote the progress of the arts.
It is outside this Article's scope to conduct an empirical discussion of
whether the current law of fictional character ownership optimally
promotes copyright's objectives. However, when copyright protection is
increased on an uncertain basis and upon reasoning that contains
incoherent elements, the courts, the copyright owners, and the public
should reflect on whether such increased protection actually fulfills
copyright's constitutional objective.57
148. See MGM, 900 F. Supp. at 1294.
149. Id. at 1297-99.
150. Id. at 1298.
151. SCHWABACH, supra note 27, at 36.
152. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
153. Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ'ns, Inc., 111 F.2d 432, 433 (2d Cir. 1940).
154. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2010).
155. DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012, 1027 (9th Cir. 2015).
156. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
157. Such concerns have been expressed repeatedly in the literature. See, e.g., Kurtz, supra
note 29, at 524 ("Overextending character protection impoverishes the public domain and
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D. Reconsidering Nichols and the Idea-Expression Dichotomy
One possible solution to the law's incoherence and uncertainty
could be more robust discussion and application of the idea-expression
dichotomy in fictional character cases.158 After all, such discussion was
markedly lacking in the Towle case.15 9 However, the idea-expression
dichotomy, as presently construed by the law, will not offer much
assistance. To understand why, a reconsideration of Nichols is in order,
as this case significantly influenced both the development of the
sufficiently delineated test16 0 and the idea-expression dichotomy in US
copyright law.16 1 Nichols involved the reproduction of nonliteral
elements from the plaintiffs play in the defendant's play.162 Although
no precise words were reproduced, both plays featured feuding Jewish
and Irish families whose children's ultimate marriage brought about
reconciliation between the families.163 In justification, Judge Learned
Hand famously stated:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last
may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about,
and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of ab-
stractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could
prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his property is
never extended. Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever
can.164
To Judge Learned Hand, the defendant only copied ideas of the
plaintiffs play and no expression had been taken.165 What was
significant about Learned Hand's reasoning was that he was careful to
emphasize that the possibility of nonliteral copying being
infringement.16 6 In such a case, a court would have to make an
"abstraction" of the allegedly infringed work and compare it with an
unnecessarily limits competition."); see also Thomas F. Cotter, Transformative Use and Cognizable
Harm, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH L. 701, 704-05 (2010); Samuel J. Coe, Note, The Story of a
Character: Establishing the Limits of Independent Copyright Protection for Literary Characters, 86
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1305, 1329 (2011).
158. See Said, supra note 29, at 812.
159. See generally Towle, 802 F.3d 1012.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 95-103.
161. See Samuels, supra note 42, at 344 ("After Nichols, there are hardly any more cases
... in which copying is an infringement only if it is literal."); id. at 358-59 (discussing reliance by
Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1983), on Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930)).
162. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121-22.
163. Id. at 122.
164. Id. at 121.
165. Id. at 121-22.
166. Id. at 121 ("It is of course essential to any protection of literary property ... that the
right cannot be limited literally to the text.").
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"abstraction" of the allegedly infringing work.167 Judge Learned Hand
went on to hypothesize that detailed enough copying of a character that
was also sufficiently detailed, such as Malvolio from Shakespeare's play
Twelfth Night, could be sufficient to constitute copyright infringement,
thereby also inspiring the sufficiently delineated test:
If Twelfth Night were copyrighted, it is quite possible that a second comer might so
closely imitate Sir Toby Belch or Malvolio as to infringe, but it would not be enough
that for one of his characters he cast a riotous knight who kept wassail to the dis-
comfort of the household, or a vain and foppish steward who became amorous of his
mistress. These would be no more than Shakespeare's "ideas" in the play, as little
capable of monopoly as Einstein's Doctrine of Relativity, or Darwin's theory of the
Origin of Species. It follows that the less developed the characters, the less they can
be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too indis-
tinctly.
1 68
This was a significant moment in US copyright law in light of
earlier cases, which seemed to operate on a stricter version of the idea-
expression dichotomy.169 In these cases, only the "literal" words of the
author were construed as protected expression.170 For example, in
Stowe v. Thomas, a translation of a novel was deemed to not infringe on
the copyrighted work.171 In contrast, Judge Learned Hand had a
broader, indeterminate conception, whereby expression could be
something a bit more abstract. Learned Hand was well aware of the
consequences of his indeterminate conception-that copyright would be
forever intertwined with a certain vagueness, a certain impossibility of
drawing the boundary between ideas and expression.172
The problem of this vagueness is that it seems to result in judges
deciding cases on a variety of non-legal factors. Edward Samuels put it
this way: "[The idea-expression dichotomy] doctrine is so general in its
statement as to defy particular application. It is not a doctrine that can
be used predictably . . . instead, it seems to be an ex post facto
characterization that justifies an outcome based upon other, more
concrete, factors."173
Samuels' point is well illustrated by the cases littering the law
of fictional character ownership. Each of the three cases-Nichols,174
167. See id. (referencing "abstractions" being made of a text).
168. Id.
169. Samuels, supra note 42, at 334-44.
170. See, e.g., White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908); Johnson
v. Donaldson, 3 F. 22, 24 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880); see also Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 208
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514).
171. Stowe, 23 F. Cas. at 208.
172. See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 ("Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and
nobody ever can.").
173. Samuels, supra note 42, at 324.
174. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
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Warner Bros.,175 and Towle,176which laid down a new test for character
copyrightability-seems best explained by recourse to the court's
intuitions as to where the justice of the case lied, as opposed to just a
straight forward application of existing legal precedent. This is not to
say that legal precedent has played no part in how the law has
developed. However, given past strained use of legal principles, it
seems more than plausible that these personal judicial intuitions form
part of the "other, more concrete, factors"177 that affect a judge's decision
as to whether a character is an unprotectable idea or protectable
expression.
Reacting to Towle, a fair number of commentators have
expressed sentiments that the case's outcome was right, despite their
criticism of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning.178 One commentator put it
well: "Part of the Towle decision surely was the desire to punish a bad
actor . . . . However, the analysis that reached the desired result
required a tortured reading of the law and a willfully blind
consideration of facts . . . ."179
In relation to Warner Bros., the source of the story being told
test, it is important to note that the court deciding Sam Spade was not
a copyrightable character favored the interests of Dashiell Hammett,
the creator of Sam Spade, because the main issue of the case was
whether Hammett had contracted away his right to write new stories
about Sam Spade.18 0 The Ninth Circuit ultimately decided that parties
did not intend for Hammett to contract his rights away.181 In dicta, the
court concluded that even if the parties did intend for Hammett to
contract away his rights in his book, The Maltese Falcon, Sam Spade
still would not have been contracted away.182 He was just a vehicle for
the story being told and so "did not go with the sale of the story."18 3
Hence, one commentator wondered whether the court "went out of its
way to create a test under which Hammett would win" due to
175. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954).
176. DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012, 1021 (9th Cir. 2015).
177. Samuels, supra note 42, at 324; see also supra note 173 and accompanying text.
178. Alphonso, supra note 125, at 8 ("Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately reached the
appropriate outcome by protecting the Batmobile, these three factors [used by the Court] do not
ensure a fair and just result in all similar cases."); Brenner, supra note 125, at 506 ("Finally, even
though the Ninth Circuit likely reached the right result, its reasoning for protecting the Batmobile
was improperly based on the inconsistent or uncopyrightable traits of the Batmobile."); Huthwaite,
supra note 21 ("How then do we justify the Court of Appeals decision, and was it the correct result
reached through the wrong means?").
179. Brenner, supra note 125, at 515.
180. Warner Bros. Pictures, 216 F.2d at 948-49.





Hammett's status as creator.184 This view has some ancillary support
from the case of Gaiman v. McFarlane.185 Judge Posner stated that
although he thought the decision was "wrong," it was "perhaps
understandable on the 'legal realist' ground that Hammett . . . wanted
to reuse his own character."186
Finally, in Nichols, Judge Learned Hand firmly believed in the
necessity of the vagueness that opened the door for character
copyrightability.18 7 This belief was underpinned by another strong
intuition that copyright also had to cover nonliteral copying. 188
As a result, it seems doubtful that greater recourse to the idea-
expression dichotomy will help alleviate the current problems apparent
in the law of fictional character ownership. Indeed, it is more likely
that use of the dichotomy will result in judges veiling the possible
influence of extralegal factors on their reasoning. Nevertheless, the
idea-expression dichotomy is still a fundamental principle of copyright
law, and copyright law clearly covers cases of nonliteral copying
today.189 The resulting question, though, is whether the vagueness is
necessary and whether copyright needs to cover nonliteral copying.
This may seem like an absurd question today, but perhaps considering
another perspective can show that what may seem like a necessity can
in fact be a choice. Hundreds of years ago, Johann Gottlieb Fichte
proposed a way to fix that impossible boundary.
III. EIGHTEENTH CENTURY GERMANY: THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHANN
GOTTLIEB FICHTE
A. Writing at the Dawn of Copyright
Johann Gottlieb Fichte was a German philosopher who is mainly
known today for his contributions to German idealism in the late
seventeenth to early eighteenth century.190 His article, Proof of the
184. SCHWABACH, supra note 27, at 31.
185. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660 (7th Cir. 2004).
186. Id.
187. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
188. Id. ("It is of course essential to any protection of literary property, whether at common-
law or under the statute, that the right cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist
would escape by immaterial variations. That has never been the law, but, as soon as literal
appropriation ceases to be the test, the whole matter is necessarily at large . . . .").
189. This point is emphasized by cases protecting computer programs. See, e.g., Comput.
Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, 982 F. 2d 693, 721 (2d Cir. 1992).
190. Dan Brezeale, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2018),
https://plato.stanford.edularchives/sum2018/entries/johann-fichte/ [https://perma.cc[FK6Y-BFHT]
(last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
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Unlawfulness of Reprinting, was published in Berlin in 1793.191 In it,
Fichte espoused a radical conception of the idea-expression dichotomy,
restricting copyright to the literal words of the text.192 At the time the
article was written, Germany did not possess any formal copyright laws
except for the notion of privileges,193 which were effectively royal grants
of temporary and exclusive rights to publish books.194 In Germany and
in other countries, however, a vigorous debate on the existence and
nature of copyright was occurring at this time 95 when a string of cases
working out the effects of England's first copyright statute196 had
recently been decided.197 The concept of "author" as romantic genius
was emerging with its key advocate being Edward Young.198 Young
argued that authors could create new ideas, as opposed to merely being
inspired from nature or from the divine.199
Fichte joined the intellectual property debate through his
article. He sought to present a justification for how an author could
have perpetual exclusive property in a book he had published, such that
unauthorized reprinting could be shown unlawful.200 Fichte did this by
dissecting a book into various aspects. He maintained that one aspect,
the book's "form," was unique and inalienable to, the author, and this
was what gave the author perpetual exclusive property in a book-or in
modern language, "copyright."201 Fichte's justification involved both an
appeal to a logical deduction from an epistemological premise about the
191. See generally Fichte, supra note 46.
192. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
193. Mario Biagioli, Genius Against Copyright: Revisiting Fichte's Proof of the Illegality of
Reprinting, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1847, 1851 (2011).
194. STEF VAN GOMPEL, FORMALITIES IN COPYRIGHT LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR HISTORY,
RATIONALES AND POSSIBLE FUTURE 56 (2011).
195. Graham Mayeda, Commentary on Fichte's "The Illegality of Unauthorised Reprinting
of Books'. An Essay on Intellectual Property During the Age of Entertainment, 5 U. OTIAWA L. &
TECH. J. 141, 145 (2008).
196. Act for the Encouragement of Learning (Statute of Anne) 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19 (Gr. Brit.).
197. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Beckett (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (reversing Millar v. Taylor's
judgment); Millar v. Taylor (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201; Tonson v. Collins (1762) 96 Eng. Rep. 180; see
also Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of Modern
Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51, 53 (1988) (discussing the early cases on the Statute of Anne).
198. See Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal
Conditions of the Emergence of the'Author, 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425, 430 (1984).
199. Id. See generally Edward Young, Conjectures on Original Composition: In a Letter to
the Author of Sir Charles Grandison, in ENGLISH CRITICAL ESSAYS: SIXTEENTH, SEVENTEENTH AND
EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 270 (Edmund D. Jones ed., 1922).
200. See Fichte, supra note 46, at 443, 445-47. Fichte's article was an explicit response to
a J.A.H. Reimarus' earlier article. See generally J.A.H. Reimarus, Publishing from the Perspective
of the Writer, the Publisher, and the Public, Reconsidered, DEUTSCHES MAGAZIN 383 (1791).
201. Fichte, supra note 46, at 451.
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human learning process, as well as an appeal to contemporary moral
norms and writing practices.202
Fichte's views were influential. In Germany, the justification of
copyright-especially as a natural right-is often attributed to Kant,
Hegel, and Fichte.203 A preliminary paper to the Prussian Copyright
Act of 1837 even gave indirect credit to Fichte.204
The past influence of Fichte's views suggests that it is worth
investigating why his strict conception of the idea-expression dichotomy
differs from Judge Learned Hand's loose conception and to what extent
it would be beneficial and also practicable to bring Fichte's differences
into today's law.
B. A Radical Idea-Expression Dichotomy
Fichte's goal was to find out whether there was any part of a
book that an author could own as exclusive property.205 His starting
premise was an axiom stipulating a condition for when a person could
own something as exclusive property: "We are the rightful owners of a
thing the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible."206
The following figure presents a graphical depiction of Fichte's
dissection of an object:
202. See id. at 450 ("Each individual has his own thought processes, his own way of forming
concepts and connecting them."); id. at 452-56 (discussing various social norms); id. at 452 ("Up
until now writers have never taken it amiss that we make use of their texts.").
203. See, e.g., Haimo Schack, Zur Rechtfertigung Des Urheberrechts Als
Ausschlie/llichkeitsrecht, in GEISTIGES EIGENTUM: SCHUTZRECH ODER AUSBEUTUNGSTITEL? 123,
127 (Otto Depenheuer & Klaus-Nikolaus Peifer eds., 2008). See also Colin McQuillan, German
Idealism, in THE INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (James Fieser & Bradley Dowden,
eds.), https://www.iep.utm.edu/germideal [https://perma.cc/ZC97-5C8K] (last visited Sept. 28,
2018).
204. Philipsborn, Preliminary Paper to the Prussian Copyright Act of 1837, quoted in E.
Wadle, Das Peuplische Urheberrechtsgesetz von 1837 Im Spiegel Seiner Vorgeschichte, in WOHER
KoMMTDAS URHEBERRECHT UND WOHIMGEHTES? 55, 65 (R. Dittrich ed., 1988), quoted in Martin
Kretschmer & Friedemann Kawohl, The History and Philosophy of Copyright, in MUSIC AND
COPYRIGHT 36 (Simon Frith & Lee Marshall Eds., 2004) ("What inviolably remains the author's
and can be identified as the real intellectual property . . ., is the particular form, in which he has
expressed his thoughts. These principles are not new, they already have been laid down in the 90s
of the last century by learned men . . . ."); see also Biagioli, supra note 193, at 1853-54.
205. See Fichte, supra note 46, at 443-45.
206. Id. at 446.
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Figure 1. Fichte's Dissection of an Object
OBJECT
1 PHYSICAL ASPE7CT IDEA L AS PECT
CONTENTASPECT FORM ASPECT
As demonstrated by the above figure, Fichte started with a
physical object, such as a book, and dissected it into a physical and an
ideal aspect.2 0 7 The physical aspect referred to what the object was
made out of, such as the printed pages of a book.208 Fichte then
dissected the object's ideal aspect into content and form.209 Content
referred to the ideas presented in the book, and form referred to "the
way in which, the combination in which, [and] the phrasing and
wording in which" the book's ideas were presented.210 This dissection
is the basis of what is now known as the idea-expression dichotomy.
Fichte seemingly conceptualized ideas as a particular viewpoint
or perspective on a subject.211  For example, Kant's opinions on
epistemology-laid out in The Critique of Pure Reason-were labeled as
"ideas" by Fichte.212 In contrast, Fichte constituted form, such as that
in a book, as the precise "phrasing and wording" in which a certain idea
is presented.213 By implication, the actual words that made up the text
of The Critique of Pure Reason would likely be seen as form to Fichte.
C. Fichte's System of Ownership
In his article, Fichte constructed a system of ownership for
intangibles wherein the nature and scope of ownership differed
depending on the nature of the intangible, asking whether it was an
idea or form.




211. See id. at 448.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 447.
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1. Ownership of Ideas
Fichte thought that the creator of an idea owned that idea as
"exclusive property" until publication occurred.214 The creator had the
right to exploit the idea in whatever ways she saw fit. 2 15
Postpublication, however, the author was susceptible to the possibility
of his idea becoming owned by others as "common property."2 16 A
person who purchased the physical aspect of an object had a "natural
law" right217 to exploit the ideas presented by or underlying that
object.218 Interested parties could, for example, purchase a physical
book presenting the author's idea and then undertake "assiduous and
rational study" of that idea.219  If the reader understood and so
assimilated the author's idea into his or her own thinking processes, the
reader would become an additional owner of the idea.220
However, Fichte conceded that an exception to the use of ideas
as common property needed to exist due to considerations of fairness.221
He used the example of what he called "works of the mechanical arts."2 2 2
Although people had natural law rights to exploit the idea aspect of an
object they bought, Fichte suggested that "the exercise of this right is
not fair. It is not fair that the man who invested his money and years
of hard work and effort should find himself robbed of the fruits of his
labor as soon as he goes public with the results . . . ."223 Hence, the law
needed to grant creators exclusive rights over their ideas, but only long
enough to achieve the goal of "compensating the original inventor" for
his labors in devising the idea.2 2 4 Afterwards, the general public could
exercise its rights to exploit the creator's ideas once again. 225
214. Id. at 448.
215. See id. at 466 ("[O]ne has the right to use one's own property however one
wishes . . . .").
216. Id. at 450.
217. See id. at 467.
218. See id. at 466.
219. Id. at 448-49.
220. Id. at 448.
221. Id. at 466-67.
222. Id. at 463-68 (using study lamps and paintings as examples of products of the
"mechanical arts").
223. Id. at 466.
224. Id. at 467.
225. Id.
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2. Ownership of Form (System of Copyright)
To Fichte, a creator would own her form as exclusive property
"forever," regardless of whether publication had occurred.226 In modern
day language, Fichte thought that creators should own their expression
of ideas as perpetual copyright. "Form" was the part of a book that an
author could perpetually own as exclusive property-it was a thing that
was impossible for another person to appropriate from the author.227
Fichte, an epistemologist, fittingly employed an epistemological
justification for copyright.228 The philosopher started with a premise
about the human learning process-that people learn things through
"analogy."229 In other words, when a person encountered a new idea,
Fichte thought that the person would compare it with ideas she already
knew. That person would then learn that idea by "reworking" the idea
into his or her existing thought patterns.230  Since each person
possessed a unique pool of ideas with which to analogize, that person
would use a unique thought pattern to assimilate a new idea resulting
in a unique way, or form, of expressing that idea.231 As a result, Fichte
thought that if one person imparted an idea to another person, it would
be "impossible" for the latter person to express that idea with the very
same form.2 3 2 Fichte famously reasoned, "[E]ach writer must give his
thoughts a certain form, and he can give them no other form than his
own because he has no other."233
Ownership of form could not be transferred. Fichte thought this
was "physically impossible."234 It seems that he thought an author's
form was essentially as unique and inalienable to her as her own
fingerprint.235 Copyright infringement was not so much theft but an
unauthorized impersonation of the author. This explains why the
philosopher then reasoned that an author's rights over his form were
226. See id. at 451.
227. Id.
228. Fichte is known for his work in developing Immanuel Kant's epistemological theory of
transcendental idealism. See Brezeale, supra note 190. Epistemology is a field of philosophy that
is concerned with the nature of knowledge and how we come to possess it.
229. See Fichte, supra note 46, at 450 ("All that we think we must think according to the
analogy of our other habits of thought . . .
230. Id.
231. See id. at 450-51.
232. Id. at 451.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 450.
235. For a similar point, see Biagioli, supra note 193, at 1858 ("Fichte ... is simply stating




not only perpetual, but also "absolute."236 They included "the right to
prevent anyone from disputing [the person's] ownership of this form,"
as well "the right to prevent anyone from infringing upon his exclusive
ownership."237
Given Fichte's strict notion of form, in his view, only word-for-
word copying could suffice to infringe a person's ownership of form.2 3 8
Plagiarism, understood as word-for-word copying that did not credit the
form's owner, therefore, was clearly infringing.239 He distinguished this
from readers who appropriated the principles of a book and spread
them.240 In relation to paintings, only another replica painting could
constitute infringement-an engraving of a painting only exploited the
painting's ideas and therefore was noninfringing.241
It is important to emphasize Fichte's totalitarian conception of
form ownership. The philosopher did not think there were true
exceptions to such rights as he did for the ownership of ideas as public
property.242 The closest he came to discussing exceptions to form
ownership was when he discussed citations-where a person would
reproduce the form of an author in short lengths and then attribute the
form to the author.243 He observed the writing norms and practices of
his contemporary community and concluded that authors seemed to
give an implied "authorization" for the activity-"an unspoken
agreement among writers to cite each other by direct quotation of their
own words."244 Nevertheless, Fichte classified this exception as an
"authorization," meaning authors could presumably withdraw such
authorizations.245  In other words, Fichte thought there was a
contemporary social norm whereby authors gave an implied license for
anyone to replicate their words for the purpose of making citations.
236. Fichte, supra note 46, at 456.
237. Id. at 451-52.
238. Note, the Author's interpretation appears different to that of Kretschmer & Kawohl's,
who calls Fichte's concept of form "ambiguous." Martin Kretschmer & Friedemann Kawohl, The
History and Philosophy of Copyright, in MUSIC AND COPYRIGHT (Simon Frith & Lee Marshall eds.,
2004). Given the amount of textual evidence for a singular strict concept, the Author prefers the
interpretation set forth in this Article.
239. Fichte, supra note 46, at 453.
240. Id. at 454.
241. Id. at 468.
242. See supra notes 221-25 and accompanying text (discussing the exception for idea
ownership, which relates to fairly compensating inventors).
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D. Comparing Two Systems of Copyright
Fichte's system of owning ideas and expressions both
foreshadow and diverge from modern US copyright law in many
significant ways. One of the most pertinent similarities between
Fichte's system and the present system is that both possess a similar
conception of the originality doctrine. To Fichte, every person had a
unique, or original, manner of expressing an idea.24 6 Although he gave
exceptions for cases in which expression was constrained by functional
considerations,247 the act of putting an idea into a person's own words
or images was enough to make a work original.248 This sounds similar
to today's copyright law, which requires a work to be independently
created (the work's expression has not been copied from other works)
and possess a slight degree of creativity.249 Indeed, Fichte's views seem
to resonate with those of Justice Holmes in Bleistein: "Personality
always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in
handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something
irreducible, which is one man's alone."250
However, aside from the above, there are at least two
noteworthy ways in which Fichte's system sharply differs from the
modern US copyright system. The first difference is the most important
for the purposes of this Article and concerns the idea-expression
dichotomy. Fichte adopted a radical conception of the idea-expression
dichotomy wherein expression, or form, was limited to the precise words
or images used to convey an idea.251 To Fichte, copyright essentially
only prohibited literal copying. In contrast, Judge Learned Hand
adopted a more indeterminate dichotomy in Nichols wherein expression
could be something more than the precise words or images used to
246. Id. at 451; see also supra text accompanying note 231.
247. See Fichte, supra note 46, at 464 ("[For products of the mechanical arts, it] cannot be
said of this ideal aspect hat it has a form unique to the maker because it is itself a concept which
underlies a specific form - the form taken by the material, the relationship of the individual parts
to the realization of the object's intended purpose - and hence can be defined in only one way
. . . ."). However, some of the form could still be unique to the maker: "Here it is rather the physical
aspect hat, insofar as it is not determined by the underlying concept, takes on an individual form."
Id.
248. See id. at 452-54. Fichte discusses the dissemination of scholarly works and notes that
"readers appropriated their principles, presented them from different points of view, and applied
them to different subjects . . . [and] in the case of light reading, people have imitated the books'
manner." Id. at 452. He further noted that in such cases, "we make use of that which can be our
joint property," referring to ideas, and "demonstrate that this is so by giving it our own form." Id.
at 454.
249. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
250. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
251. Fichte, supra note 46, at 447; see supra Section III.B.
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convey an idea.2 5 2 Copyright was extended to cover certain cases of
nonliteral copying-such as the copying of fictional characters.253 The
vagueness inherent in Judge Learned Hand's conception is significantly
reduced by the bright-line test that Fichte's conception entails.
The consequences of Fichte's bright-line test cannot be
understated. Many acts that would likely be considered infringing
under today's law could well be considered original copyrightable works
under a Fichtean framework of thinking. For example, the Copyright
Act gives a copyright owner an adaptation right allowing the owner to
prevent inter alia any unauthorized "translation," "abridgment," or
"any other form in which [the] work may be recast, transformed or
adapted."254 In contrast, as has already been discussed, Fichte thought
that making an engraving of a painting would never be copyright
infringement.2 5 5 Fichte gave greater recognition to the original efforts
of a nonliteral copier than the law does today. This did not mean that
Fichte thought all nonliteral copying was acceptable-he discussed
giving temporary exclusive rights to inventors postpublication.256
Essentially, Fichte thought copyright was not the way to regulate
nonliteral copying. Other laws needed to be utilized.
Secondly, Fichte's system of copyright was founded on natural
law reasoning, as opposed to the Constitution's utilitarian objective for
copyright.257 Fichte's views were that a person had rights to things that
could not be alienated from him. A person's form-that person's way of
expressing a particular idea-could not be alienated from that person
and was so owned by that person as exclusive property.258 Copyright
had the nature of a "personal right" to Fichte, which explained why
copyright owners gained a totalitarian ownership over form as well as
the right to prevent someone disputing ownership of that form.259 As a
result, the philosopher effectively allowed no exceptions to copyright.260
This contrasts with the statutory exceptions in place today.261
Furthermore, Fichte's right to prevent someone disputing ownership of
252. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d. 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); see supra Section
IID.
253. See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
254. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); § 106(2) (adaptation right).
255. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
256. See supra Section III.C.L
257. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, with Fichte, supra note 46, at 444-45.
258. See Fichte, supra note 46, at 451.
259. See id. at 451-52.
260. See supra Section III.C.2.
261. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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form best correlates to the modern right of attribution.262 In the United
States, however, this right is only granted to authors of visual works of
art.263
Fichte was strongly opposed to founding any intellectual
property rights on utilitarian grounds. He lamented: "When will people
ever develop a feeling for the noble idea of justice, without any regard
for utility?" 2 64  Although Fichte's proposal of granting temporary
exclusive rights to ideas may remind us of today's US patent system
(also founded on a utilitarian basis),2 65 his "patents" were granted on
moral grounds of fair compensation.266 Fichte was strongly motivated
to base his copyright on moral grounds because this allowed him to
sidestep' an opponent's utilitarian argument that copyright should not
exist because it would ban the reprinting of books-a "useful
practice."267 The philosopher ended his article with a parody on
utilitarianism, wherein a thief argued that his activity of stealing
medicine ought to be lawful because it had greatly benefited the public:
"As everyone knows, the only true measure of the excellence of our
actions is their utility." 2 68
The upshot of this discussion is that there is indeed an
alternative to Judge Learned Hand's conception of the idea-expression
dichotomy or even an alternative to the copyright system the law has in
place today. Fichte defined the idea-expression dichotomy relatively
strictly and used that dichotomy to mark out the boundaries of his
system of copyright. However, as the next part of this Article shows,
Fichte's philosophy is not only different, but can also offer practical
insights into the ownership of fictional characters today.
IV. APPLYING FICHTE'S PHILOSOPHY TO THE OWNERSHIP OF FICTIONAL
CHARACTERS
Fichte did not explicitly have fictional characters in mind when
writing his article. However, the principles of Fichte's philosophy and
262. The right of attribution is an author's right to be attributed as the author of his or her
work. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 86, § 8D.03. The United Kingdom is one
jurisdiction which has recognized this right in statute. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act
1988, c. 48, § 77 (UK).
263. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). Moral rights have a nearly nonexistent presence in US
copyright law. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 86, § 8D.02.
264. Fichte, supra note 46, at 460.
265. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C.§ 1 (2012) (Patents Act).
266. Fichte, supra note 46, at 466.
267. Id. at 444-45, 473.
268. Id. at 474-76. At the end of the thiefs argument, the story's monarch "had the useful
man hanged." Id. at 483.
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system of ownership can meaningfully be applied to fictional
characters, resulting in a "Fichtean" perspective.
A. Seeing Fictional Characters as Ideas
Fichte's system of ownership for ideas and expressions operates
such that the nature of ownership applicable to a fictional character
would depend on what type of entity a fictional character is.269 For the
reasons that follow, it is most likely that Fichte would construe fictional
characters as ideas.
A fictional character can be said to be some sort of individual
that does not exist in real life. Articulating a more specific definition
can quickly become difficult. As aptly demonstrated by a Time
magazine article, "The Top 10 Fictional Characters of 2017," fictional
characters are a diverse group of entities.270 The article's list ranges
from characters like Wonder Woman to the dragon Viserion from Game
of Thrones to Julia the Muppet.271 Fictional characters adopt various
shapes and sizes and appear in all sorts of creative media. This is,
again, reflected by the variety of fictional characters that have been
protected by US courts.272 Fictional characters are also individually
diverse. Much like the shapeshifting Proteus of Greek mythology, a
single fictional character can also be subject to many diverse
manifestations. This is exemplified by the Batmobile's diverse
appearances in Batman comic books, television series, and films over
the years.27 3
Therefore, it does not seem appropriate to construe fictional
characters as objects that can be dissected into physical and ideal
aspects. This is because the objects Fichte dissected in his article were
things that one tends to think of in their physical senses, such as a
book,274 study lamp,2 7 5 or painting.276 He seemed to start with a
physical object and then draw out the object's intangible aspects.277 In
contrast, one may not always think of a fictional character in its
269. See supra Section III.C.
270. Daniel D'Addario, The Top 10 Fictional Characters of 2017, TIME (Dec. 5, 2017),
http://time.com/5048703/top-10-fictional-characters-2017/ [https://perma.cc/EUM5-9JSV].
271. Id.
272. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 11-15 (referencing the protection of Batman,
Godzilla, and Jonathan Livingston Seagull); see also supra Part II (referencing the protection of
Mickey Mouse, James Bond, and Holden Caulfield).
273. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
274. Fichte, supra note 46, at 447.
275. Id. at 468.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 447; see also, Biagioli, supra note 193, at 1864-65
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physical sense, and, indeed, a fictional character may seem to have a
multiplicity of physical senses-such as the Batmobile-which has been
portrayed through both text and film. 2 7 8 We do not point to a comic book
panel that portrays the Batmobile and say that the comic book panel is
the Batmobile-it is, after all, just a printed sheet of paper.
Furthermore, even though we may have seen different iterations of the
Batmobile in different mediums, we still seem to recognize all of these
iterations as the same entity-Batman's car. Given the dynamic and
elastic nature of a fictional character, it seems artificial to classify a
fictional character as an object like the book or painting referenced by
Fichte.
It also seems artificial to classify fictional characters as "form,"
given Fichte's strict conception of the term.2 7 9 Just as a certain
philosophical theory may have multiple modes of expression, so may
any fictional character have multiple modes of expression.
Commentators have continually recognized fictional characters as
having the capacity to live "independent legal lives."280 The very ability
to recognize a fictional character in a context outside its original work281
points against a fictional character being reduced to a discrete
expression. This also makes sense when considering that fictional
characters are very much products of interpretation. As reiterated by
Professor Said, fictional characters can be said to run "on minds of
readers just as computer simulations run on computers."282
What follows from the above proposition is that when a person
first conceives of a fictional character, that character is created as an
idea in that person's head. However, the creator will likely give this
idea a certain expression and manifest that expression in a certain
physical sense-such as writing a story about the character or drawing
the character, for example. When the expression is manifested, it seems
best to say that the fictional character is an idea that is described
through a certain means of expression, embodied in a certain physical
object. Given a fictional character's dynamic nature, one might say that
that a fictional character can grow more complex over time. As people
278. See supra Part I.
279. See supra Section III.B.
280. Kurtz, supra note 29, at 430 ("A character, however, is a nimble creature. It is not
confined to the work in which it first appears, but can be removed from its original context to lead
a new and independent life."); Said, supra note 29, at 771 ("In a fundamental way, then, characters
lead independent lives in their readers' imaginations, in subsequent works of literature, and in
the public sphere.").
281. For example, many would recognize the Batmobile outside the context of a Batman
film, television series, or comic book.
282. Said, supra note 29, at 771 (quoting Annie Murphy Paul, Your Brain on Fiction, N.Y.




come up with additional ideas as to who the fictional character is, the
fictional character becomes more complex, existing as an array of
multiple ideas linked together.
B. A Fichtean System of Fictional Character Ownership
The most obvious implication of construing fictional characters
as ideas is that they are not appropriate subjects of copyright. When a
person creates a fictional character, that person will temporarily own
that fictional character as exclusive property.283 The creator has the
right to exploit the character in whatever ways she sees fit. 28 4 However,
upon publication of the character, the creator opens up the possibility
for others to own that fictional character too.2 8 5 In the case of a written
story, a reader gains ownership of a fictional character once she
understands the creator's concept of the fictional character in his or her
own mind. Consequentially, readers will be free to exploit their shared
ownership of the character. The possible caveat to readers exercising
their shared right would be a situation where the law restricted such
individuals' rights temporarily in order to fairly compensate creators.286
Under a Fichtean framework of thinking, creators of fictional
characters may not be able to exert completely exclusive ownership over
fictional characters. However, creators will always be able to exert a
completely exclusive ownership over the ways in which they have
expressed their characters. Each person effectively has their own
unique way of expressing a fictional character. If a literary form is
utilized, this would be the particular combination of words a person
uses to describe a character; if a graphical form is utilized, this would
be a particular combination of colors and lines.
Applying Fichte's philosophy to the ownership of fictional
characters helps us understand the very nuanced relationship between
a creator and his or her character. A character, as an idea, has an
independent existence from its creator and can potentially be owned by
all the world. This explains why one intuitively distinguishes a physical
book about, for example, Sherlock Holmes, from the character
himself.287 One does not hold up a physical copy of A Study in Scarlet288
283. See supra Section IlI.C.L
284. See supra Section III.C. L
285. See supra Section 1IIC..
286. See supra Section III.C. 1.
287. For the curious, it is worth noting that the Seventh Circuit has held that Sherlock
Holmes was a copyrightable character from the time of the first Sherlock Holmes novel in 1887.
Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 2014). However, note that the
court also held that Sherlock Holmes is now in the public domain. Id.
288. See generally ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, A STUDY IN SCARLET (1887).
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and call it Sherlock Holmes. Rather, A Study in Scarlet is a book about
Sherlock Holmes.
- Moreover, a character is neither completely independent of its
creator nor independent to how that character has been expressed.
Under a Fichtean perspective, the link between an author and the text
that expresses the character is so close, that Fichte says the expression
is essentially part of the author's person.289 A character only really
develops through a creator expressing her or his ideas of that character.
Sherlock Holmes effectively only walks because Sir Arthur Conan Doyle
has written that Sherlock Holmes walks.290 Sherlock Holmes is not Sir
Arthur Conan Doyle, but he is dependent on Doyle's actions to exist.
Hence, a creator owns his or her expressed story or interpretation of the
character. This supports Professor Said's research, wherein she first
observed that US courts found it hard to disentangle literary fictional
characters from a source text to find them copyrightable.291 Professor
Said then argued that this difficulty occurred because the link between
the text that expressed the character and the character itself was very
close.2 9 2 Applying Fichte's philosophy also helps us understand why a
text and a character in that text might have such a close relationship-
the text is part of the character.
A Fichtean perspective can balance the variety of attitudes
towards character appropriation that can be found in today's writing
community. Often the discourse has been centered around the topic of
whether writing fan fiction is acceptable.293 Fan fiction largely refers
to stories published online whereby a reader has appropriated the
characters created by a commercially published author.294 Some
authors have expressed beliefs in a wholly totalitarian ownership of
289. See supra Section III.C.2.
290. See, e.g., DOYLE, supra note 288, at 8.
291. Said, supra note 29, at 800-01.
292. Id. at 787-805.
293. See, e.g., Stephanie Burt, The Promise and Potential of Fan Fiction, NEW YORKER
(Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/the-promise-and-potential-of-fan-
fiction [https://perma.cc/7QSE-N9ZD]; Bailey Gribben, Fanfiction: A Legal Battle of Creativity,
REP. (Feb. 5, 2016), https://reporter.rit.edulviews/fanfiction-legal-battle-creativity
[https://perma.cc/YX5T-TXS9]; Cathy Young, Fan Fiction Has a Place in Literature,
BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 19, 2012),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2012/08/18/young/4TrgBkw4BhNPnEzXKh8O3I/story.html
[https://perma.cclES4N-QTD6].
294. But see Karen Hellekson & Kristina Busse, Introduction to THE FAN FICTION STUDIES
READER 1, 7 (Karen Hellekson & Kristina Busse eds., 2014) ("We look here at fan fiction as
historically situated in the last forty years, tending to respond to a specific form of media texts,
and encompassing a specific amateur infrastructure for its creation, distribution, and reception.");
SCHWABACH, supra note 27, at 8 ("Fanfic, at least for the purposes of this book, refers to works
derived from other works currently protected as intellectual property, but not explicitly authorized
and not commercially published.").
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their created characters, and thus oppose fan fiction.2 9 5 For example,
George R.R. Martin, author of The Game of Thrones, has empathetically
stated online, "My characters are my children, I have been heard to say.
I don't want people making off with them, thank you .... No one gets
to abuse the people of Westeros but me."2 9 6
This is in tension with an increasingly vocal generation of fan
fiction writers who understandably feel that their writing practices are
not so morally reprehensible.2 97 As Grace Epstein writes, explicitly
referring to authors such as George R.R. Martin: 'They like their
current position in the world, and the idea that anyone below them
could do new and inventive things with their worlds and characters ets
their nerves a-jangling. But . . . it's not their decision . . . ."298 One
commentator echoed Epstein's sentiments, defending Fredik Colting's
unauthorized sequel to J.D. Salinger's classic novel Catcher in the
Rye.299 Although the Second Circuit found that Colting had likely
infringed Salinger's copyright in both the novel and the character
Holden Caulfeld, the journalist Brigid Delaney wrote that it was time
Salinger "let [his] baby go."300
Seeing fictional characters from a Fichtean way of thinking is a
way of affirming different parts of the above views. The sentiments of
authors like George R.R. Martin are recognized to some extent-
creators do have totalitarian ownerships over certain aspects of their
created characters, namely how that character has been expressed.
This means that no one would be allowed to use any of Martin's words
without his express or implied permission. However, as this Article
demonstrates, a fictional character is not so much an "expression," but
an "idea." Secondly, creators, upon publication, open up their fictional
295. See, e.g., Diana Gabaldon, Fan Fiction and Moral Conundrums, VOYAGES OF THE
ARTEMIS (May 3, 2010, 3:43 AM), http://archive.lilLrZ17 [https://perma.cclYA5Q-JWK7] ("I
wouldn't like people writing sex fantasies for public consumption about me or members of my
family - why would I be all right with them doing it to the intimate creations of my imagination
and personality?"); Gita Jackson, It Used to Be Perilous to Write Fanfiction, KOTAKU (May 16, 2018,
3:38 PM), https://kotaku.comlit-used-to-be-perilous-to-write-fanfiction- 1826083509
[https://perma.cc/QKV6-FX2Z]; George R.R. Martin, Someone is Angry on the Internet, NOT A BLOG
(May 7, 2010, 7:35 PM), https://grrm.livejournal.com/151914.html [https://perma.cc/6M39-ETBD].
296. Martin, supra note 295.
297. See, e.g., Jena Burne, In Defense of Fanfiction, GEEKMOM (Apr. 10, 2016),
https://geekmom.com/20 16/04/in-defense-of-fanfiction/ [https://perma.cc/84LU-LS2V].
298. Grace Epstein, In Defense of Fanfiction, ODYSSEY ONLINE (Dec. 5, 2016),
https://www.theodysseyonline.com/in-defense-of-fanfiction [https://perma.cc/S4T9-FUT2].
299. Brigid Delaney, J. D. Salinger, It's Time to Let Your Baby Go, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD (June 12, 2009), https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/jd-salinger-its-time-to-let-your-
baby-go-20090611-c4ty.html [https://perma.ccVWP7-M48C]. See generally JOHN DAVID
CALIFORNIA, 60 YEARS LATER: COMING THROUGH THE RYE (2009).
300. Delaney, supra note 299. Delaney continued, writing "[s]o good was he at creating a
fully formed, truthful, distinct character that just walked off the page and into readers' lives, he
can no longer be said to own Holden. Rather it is a character owned by readers." Id.
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characters to be shared with readers-this recognizes Delaney's
sentiments.301  Hence, under a Fichtean framework of thinking,
fictional characters can be seen as ideas that are ultimately ownable by
all the world-or in other words, "beyond copyright." What is not
beyond copyright is each person's expression of a fictional character. To
Fichte, a person owns this expression perpetually and absolutely.302
C. Two Systems of Fictional Character Ownership
Adopting a Fichtean perspective on fictional character
ownership would enable the United States to avoid much of the
uncertainty and incoherence plaguing today's law of fictional character
ownership.303 Two points are worth emphasizing. Firstly, adopting
Fichte's manner of thinking would give the law, in some ways, a simpler
test to follow when trying to discern to what extent a fictional character
is protected by copyright. Under present copyright law, a fictional
character can be owned as an independent copyrighted work-provided
it passes a copyrightability test-which differs depending on the nature
of the fictional character.304 However, if courts follow Fichte's way of
thinking, fictional characters-whether literary, artistic, or
audiovisual-will not be proper subjects of "exclusive property" or
copyright, likely falling into the category of ideas.3 0 5 The sufficiently
delineated, story being told, and three-part tests would all be redundant
under a Fichtean framework. There would be no conception of a bias
against literary characters. Instead, the analysis would likely start
with the physical work and then draw out intangible aspects closer to
the meaning of a literary work or artistic work.306 Both descriptions
and depictions of fictional characters would be protected as part of the
author's form in such works.30 7
The history of US case law suggests that courts have viewed
characters as existing on a spectrum between the extremes of ideas and
expression.308 The more detailed a character becomes, the closer it
comes to becoming a copyrightable expression.309 For example, in
Gaiman v. McFarlane, the court found that "[a]lthough Gaiman's verbal
description of Cogliostro may well have been of a stock character, once
301. Id.
302. See supra Section III.C.2
303. See supra Part I.
304. See supra Section II.A.
305. See supra Section IV.A.
306. See supra Section 1V.A.
307. See supra Section IV.B.
308. See supra Section II.A.
309. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d. 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
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he was drawn and named and given speech he became sufficiently
distinctive to be copyrightable."310 In contrast, applying a Fichtean
conceptual framework suggests that a character is a set of ideas, and
the more detailed the character becomes, the more complex the set of
ideas it becomes. Making a character more detailed does not transform
it from an idea into an expression-it merely makes the character a
more detailed idea. Gaiman's drawings and words describing Cogliostro
constitute expressions of the idea of Cogliostro, and it is these precise
expressions that are copyrightable.
Adopting Fichte's manner of thinking would also allow us to
avoid the difficult reasoning exhibited in cases like Burroughs v. MGM,
Inc., where the judge struggled to articulate who the Tarzan character
was, independent from the works in which Tarzan had appeared.311 The
court necessarily had to draw on what Fichte would consider ideas-
features like Tarzan being raised in the jungle by apes, in tune with
nature, and so on.31 2 As Burroughs shows, the problems with this
approach is that the bounds of property become very unclear and,
perhaps, even almost impossible to define.313 To Fichte, it would only
be the precise components of a character, as expressed by an author,
that would be owned by that author.314 In relation to Tarzan, this would
be the actual words pertaining to Tarzan from the Tarzan novels.
The second point worth emphasizing is that Fichte's bright-line
test for copyright infringement would provide greater clarity in cases of
character appropriation. For example, the type of copying done in MGM
v. American Honda Motor Co. would clearly be noninfringing.315 This
is because Honda only made use of MGM's ideas-a blonde male
character, quirky villain, and other characteristics.3 16  To Fichte,
nonliteral copying was not so much property infringement as it was
property creation.317 Honda, by expressing MGM's ideas in its own way,
created a form that it owned exclusively. Fichte's bright-line test avoids
the difficulties that come with trying to compare two abstract
characters in an abstract fashion.
The two points above can also be illustrated by applying Fichte's
philosophy to DC Comics v. Towle. 318 If Fichte's philosophy had been
310. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
311. Burroughs v. MGM, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 388 (2d Cir. 1981); see also supra Section II.C.
312. See supra Section II.C.
313. See supra Section II.C.
314. See supra Section IV.B.
315. See generally MGM, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287 (C.D. Cal. 1995);
see also supra Section II.C.
316. See supra Section II.C.
317. See discussion supra Section III.D.
318. DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2015); see supra Part 0.
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the law, the Batmobile could not have been a copyrightable character.319
Furthermore, even though DC Comics may have owned copyright in the
comic strips, television series, and films depicting the Batmobile,320
Mark Towle did not make a comic strip, television'series, or film-he
made cars.321 He only, according to Fichte, appropriated the "ideas" of
DC Comics. Fichte's concerns about using ideas unfairly may well have
been triggered here, given that Towle had associated his cars with the
Batman brand to gain a commercial benefit.322 Fichte might have
thought that DC Comics ought to have been granted temporary
exclusive rights-rights that would prevent Towle from making
Batmobile replicas. This would have allowed DC Comics to be fairly
compensated for their labor in devising the Batmobile idea.3 23 Hence,
although a similar outcome may have arisen in Towle, the legal path to
get to that outcome would have been markedly different under Fichte's
bright-line test.
So far, there have been many cases whereby copyright has been
used as a means of regulating fictional character ownership. However,
considering a Fichtean perspective of fictional character ownership
points towards regulating fictional character appropriation through
means outside copyright law. The next part of this Article discusses a
case involving such extracopyright regulation.
V. THE CASE OF GOETHE AND NICOLAI
A. The Subversion of an Instant Classic
In 1774, the German author Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
published the book The Sorrows of Young Werther.324 The book was a
literary sensation. Within ten years of its release, the book had been
translated into four languages and inspired a generation of European
youth to adopt the novel's protagonist Werther as its hero.3 2 5 The book
recounted Werther's unrequited love for a young woman named
Charlotte.326 Unfortunately, because Charlotte married another man,
319. See supra Sections IV.A, IV.B.
320. See Towle, 802 F.3d at 1015--17.
321. Id. at 1017.
322. See supra Sections I, III.C.L
323. See supra Sections I, III.C.L
324. See generally GOETHE, supra note 55.
325. Frank Furedi, The Media's First Moral Panic, FRANK FUREDI: SOCIOLOGIST,






Albert,327 Werther was driven to his wits end.3 2 8 Deciding that the most
noble thing to do in the situation was to die, Werther shot himself in
the head.329
Goethe's novel enjoyed such scintillating success that it was soon
blamed for a subsequent epidemic of perceived copycat suicides
throughout Europe, and the book was banned in the German city of
Leipzig.3 30 In the wake of this, a book publisher, Friedrich Nicolai,
wrote, and in 1775 published, The Joys of Young Werther.331 Nicolai's
book parodied Goethe's book and constituted a polemic against
following Werther's suicide in any way. Nicolai conceived an
alternative ending to The Sorrows of Young Werther. In The Joys of
Young Werther, Albert and Charlotte were changed to be only engaged
when Werther decided to kill himself.3 32 Albert thwarted Werther's
suicide and persuaded Werther and "Lotte" (as Charlotte was so called
in Nicolai's parody) to marry instead.333 Through the trials and
tribulations of married life, Werther learned to give up his extreme
romanticism for a more steady, rational way of living.334
Examining Nicolai's appropriation of Goethe's characters and
Goethe's response is illuminating. This case study provides an example
of a writing community regulating the use of fictional characters
without recourse from lawsuits or proprietorial notions. It also suggests
that a moral conception of copyright can complement a utilitarian
conception.
B. The Nature of Nicolai's Appropriation
Nicolai employed many of Goethe's precise words when writing
his parody; on each and every page of Nicolai's parody, the reproduction
of Goethe's form occurred, ranging from short words and phrases to
entire sentences.335 However, in nearly all the cases where Nicolai
reproduced Goethe's phrasing or referred to Goethe's writing, Nicolai
prodigiously included a footnote directing the reader to a page from The
Sorrows of Young Werther. All in all, Nicolai explicitly referenced
327. GOETHE, supra note 55, at 128-29.
328. Id. at 209-13.
329. Id. at 222.
330. Furedi, supra note 325.
331. See generally NICOLAI, supra note 56.
332. Id. at 17-18.
333. Id. at 30-31.
334. Id. at 53-55.
335. See, e.g., infra notes 339-342 and accompanying text.
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Goethe's work sixty-one times-a sizeable number, given that The Joys
of Young Werther was only fifty-six pages long.33 6
Two of Nicolai's citations consisted of quotations. They occurred
in the context of two characters discussing The Sorrows of Young
Werther in "real life." 33 7 The majority of Nicolai's remaining citations
involved more sophisticated uses of Goethe's words. Often, Nicolai
would not only express Goethe's original idea, but also expressed
another idea that subverted Goethe's idea. For example, in Nicolai's
parody, Albert's explicit diagnosis of Werther and Lotte's marital
problems was their romanticism.338 Nicolai made Albert give an
exhortation, and bookended the exhortation with a reference to The
Sorrows of Young Werther: "Fine young sir! Love is possible, but you
must love with a human love. . . ."339 This exact same line occurred in
Goethe's work but in a very different context. Werther, prior to meeting
Charlotte, had been trying to explain to a friend why the bounds set by
society destroyed passionate love.3 4 0 Werther told the story of a man
who was wholly in love with a girl, but then was confronted by a
"Philistine"341 who rebuked the man: "My good young friend, love is
natural; but you must love within bounds."3 4 2
In The Sorrows of Young Werther, Goethe emphasized the
negative consequence of such advice, having Werther remark
disdainfully that "he may become a useful member of society. . .but it
is all up with his love . . . ."343 In The Joys of Young Werther, Werther
essentially followed the Philistine's advice, as embodied by Albert in the
336. See generally NiCOLAI, supra note 56.
337. See id. at 8 ("[I]ch las, wie er neben Alberten ging,' ... pflIckte Blumen am Wege
....translated to "I read how he walked side by side with Albert' ... plucked flowers by the
way. . . .'.") (quoting GOETHE (1774), supra note 55, at 78 (Werther recounting in a letter "Jch gehe
so neben ihm hin, und pflikke Blumen am Wege. . )); NICOLAI, supra note 56, at 12 (quoting
GOETHE (1774), supra note 55, at 160).
338. NICOLAI, supra note 56, at 44-45.
339. Id. at 45 (citing GOETHE (1774), supra note 55, at 22).
340. GOETHE, supra note 55, at 22.
341. Id. (the author's translation of the word "Philister"). For another source that
translates "Philister" and "Philistine", and also discusses Goethe's uses of the word, see
Estlle McIlvenna, The 'Philistine" in "Sturm Und Drang", 33 MODERN LANGUAGE REV. 31,
33 (1938) ("We are indebted to Goethe's Werther (1774) for the first important use of the term
in its moral and intellectual sense.... [Tihe novel suggests throughout the misery Werther
suffers from the Philistinism of society.").
342. Nicolai replicates the words of Goethe's 1774 work. NICOLAI, supra note 56, at 45.
("Feiner junger Herr! Lieben ist menschlich, nur miBt ihr menschlich lieben . . ., " referencing
Goethe's 1774 work); GOETHE (1774), supra note 55, at 22 ("Feiner junger Herr, lieben ist mensch-
lich, nur mii3t ihr menschlich lieben!").
343. GOETHE (1774), supra note 55, at 23. Note that this is the Author's translation of the
original 1774 work, which was compared with Boylan's translation of Goethe's similarly worded
1787 work. See GOETHE, supra note 55, at 7.
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text, resulting in marital bliss with Lotte.344 Nicolai thus suggested,
contradicting Goethe's portrayal of Werther, that restraining
passionate love does not kill it, but merely transforms it into a more
sustainable love, vibrant in its own way.34 5
When considering the acceptability of Friedrich Nicolai's
actions, intriguingly, a Fichtean framework of thinking would predict
the same result as current US law might-that Nicolai's appropriation
was acceptable. However, the way in which Fichte would arrive at this
result differs from how US law would arrive at that same result. First,
under either framework, Nicolai would have likely infringed Goethe's
copyright because he reproduced the exact words of Goethe's work. The
degree of infringement would have been lessened if Fichte's views are
applied to the transformative work that Nicolai created-having Albert
give the exhortation instead of a Philistine would be labeled as the mere
reproduction of ideas. In contrast, given modern copyright's broader
definition of "expression," a large amount of Nicolai's transformative
work would still be labeled as reproducing expression.
Today's law would likely have excused Nicolai's copying on the
basis that the nature of his parody constituted fair use of Goethe's work.
346 In contrast, although Fichte would have thought Nicolai would have
been at the mercies of Goethe, the philosopher would have also
predicted that Goethe would excuse Nicolai on the account that his
copying constituted citations.347  In his article, Proof of the
Unlawfulness of Reprinting, Fichte observed that there seemed to be
"an unspoken agreement among writers to cite each other by direct
quotation of their own words."3 48 This Fichtean prediction proved true;
although Goethe complained about Nicolai's actions, the nature of
Goethe's complaint was not one of theft, but artistic misinterpretation.
C. The Nature of Goethe's Response
It seems likely that Goethe adopted a perspective somewhat
akin to a Fichtean perspective on fictional character ownership in
relation to Nicolai's appropriation. In his memoirs, Goethe wrote that
344. NICOLAI, supra note 56, at 53-55.
345. Id. at 47 ("[T]heir lives flowed on like a calm stream - not as poetic a symbol as a
raging torrent, but for this very reason no less suited to those who are happy.").
346. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (fair use); see, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 579 (1994) (holding that a parody may constitute fair use); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin
Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1276 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that based on the evidence before the court,
Randall's parody THE WIND DONE GONE of Mitchell's book GONE WITH THE WIND appeared to lend
itself to a "viable fair use defense"); see also supra Section II.A.
347. See supra Section III.C.2.
348. Fichte, supra note 46, at 455.
1372018]
VAND. J ENT. & TECH. L.
the parody gave him and his friends "occasion for many a jest."34 9 To
Goethe, Nicolai was an "otherwise excellent" man who let himself down
by having to "depreciate and oppose everything that did not accord with
his own way of thinking."350 Goethe ultimately condemned Nicolai for
"interfering unasked in other people's affairs" and for meddling "with
things beyond his compass."3 5 1
The wrong done to Goethe seemed to be less about Nicolai's
appropriation of Goethe's characters, and more about Nicolai's manner
of appropriation, which Goethe found offensive. Mere character
appropriation did not seem to be a problem to Goethe. In the same
passage from his memoirs, Goethe references a "vignette" drawing done
by Daniel Chodowiecki that illustrated Nicolai's parody.352 It featured
Werther hugging Charlotte with Albert standing nearby.353 Goethe
condoned this character appropriation, saying that it gave him "much
delight; as at that time I admired this artist extravagantly."354
In contrast, Edward T. Potter suggests that Goethe was offended
by what he felt was Nicolai's "reductive misreading of the novel."3 5 5
This is reflected in Goethe citing an "old rhyme" to summarize his
feelings towards Nicolai, the poem ending with the lines "And those who
understand me not / Should better learn to read."35 6 Both authors
perceived Werther's suicide as being brought about by the effects of
hypochondria.3 5 7 Nicolai's cure for Werther's hypochondria was in
Potter's words, Werther's "integration into society."358 However, to
Goethe, Werther's hypochondria was complex and not easily solved.359
Hence, in his memoirs, Goethe remarked that Nicolai's parody seemed
to step over the fact that "Werther's youthful bloom, from the very first,
appears gnawed by a deadly worm," the "deadly worm" of
hypochondria.36 0
349. JOHANN GOTI'LIEB GOETHE, THE AUTO-BIOGRAPHY OF GOETHE. TRUTH AND POETRY:
FROM MY OWN LIFE 513 (John Oxenford trans., 1848).
350. Id.
351. Id. at 513-14.
352. Id. at 513.
353. Daniel Chodowiecki Freuden des Werther, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wikiFile:DanielChodowieckiFreuden-desWerther.jpg
[https://perma.cc/EB52-9H5Q] (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).
354. GOETHE, supra note 349, at 513.
355. Edward T. Potter, Hypochondria, Onanism, and Reading in Goethe's Werther, 19
GOETHE YEARBOOK 117, 123 (2012).
356. GOETHE, supra note 349, at 514-15.
357. Potter, supra note 355, at 122.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 123.
360. GOETHE, supra note 349, at 513-14.
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In relation to both Nicolai and Chodowiecki, Goethe made no
mention of his "property" being at issue. In contrast, Goethe did use
the phrasing of "property" when reflecting on the publisher Christian
Friedrich Himburg, who had produced unauthorized collections of
Goethe's works.361 In his memoirs, Goethe recounted his feelings of
"contempt" and "indignation" at the "robbery."362 He labeled Himburg
as one who was "making himself very comfortable with my property."363
Piracy was a major problem that Goethe continually had to confront.
By 1787-only thirteen years after The Sorrows of Young Werther was
first published-twenty pirated versions of the book existed.364 Piracy
of Goethe's later works also occurred.365 As Goethe became a more
established writer, he started taking action against his unauthorized
publishers and managed to procure a privilege that prohibited
unauthorized reprinting of his works.366
Goethe never suggested in his memoirs that he thought law
needed to be involved or that Nicolai had done something "illegal," as
opposed to something that was done in aesthetic bad taste. Instead,
Goethe did two things, both of a literary nature. First, he wrote a poem,
which he phrased as being a "way of quiet, innocent revenge."367 The
poem was incisively satirical of Nicolai. Goethe represented Nicolai as
defecating on Werther's grave and then exclaiming, "The good man, how
he ruined himself I If he had only shat like me / He wouldn't have
died!" 3 6 8 Second, Goethe wrote some prose that played off Nicolai's
parody consisted of a dialogue between Charlotte and Werther after his
failed suicide attempt.3 6 9 The fascinating outcome was essentially the
creation of more literature.
D. Where Utilitarianism and Natural Law Theory Can Coincide
Nicolai's appropriation and Goethe's response fascinatingly
display a situation where the writing community resolved its own
issues, and in a way that is consistent with a Fichtean perspective of
361. SIEGFRIED UNSELD, GOETHE AND HIS PUBLISHERS 30 (Kenneth J. Northcott trans.,
1996).
362. Id. at 31.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 24.
365. Id. at 35.
366. Id. at 32.
367. GOETHE, supra note 349, at 514.
368. PAUL FLEMING, EXEMPLARITY AND MEDIOCRITY: THE ART OF THE AVERAGE FROM
BOURGEOIS TRAGEDY TO REALISM 178 (2008) (quoting Goethe's poem and briefly discussing it).
369. GOETHE, supra note 349, at 514 (referencing this prose piece, though it is lost by the
time Goethe wrote his memoirs).
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fictional character ownership. The result of Nicolai and Goethe's short
literary spat was essentially, the production of more creative goods, and
yet, copyright was nowhere to be found.
If Goethe and Nicolai had operated in present-day United
States, Goethe might have launched a lawsuit against Nicolai. Indeed,
Nicolai and Goethe's literary exchange has striking parallels to the
facts of Salinger v. Colting,370 which also involved the appropriation of
fictional characters from a famous novel. A Swedish book publisher,
Fredrik Colting, appropriated characters from J.D. Salinger's famous
novel Catcher in the Rye371 to write his unauthorized sequel, 60 Years
Later.372 Salinger sued Colting and won in the sense that the Second
Circuit upheld the lower court's finding that Colting's sequel likely
infringed Salinger's copyright in the novel Catcher in the Rye.373
Colting's work was most likely not fair use.3 7 4 Ultimately, the dispute
was settled out of court, and Colting agreed not to publish the work in
the United States.375 If Salinger had taken a more Fichtean view of
character appropriation, perhaps he would not have taken legal action
against Colting. Salinger may have even produced more literature in
response to Colting's work. At the very least, Colting's work would not
have been suppressed, resulting in a more diverse body of literature.
A likely follow-up view of a utilitarian conception of copyright,
like what exists at present in the United States, is that a natural rights
theory of copyright is creator friendly and user unfriendly, whilst a
utilitarian based theory of copyright is more neutral between the two
parties.376 However, the Nicolai and Goethe case study suggests
something much different. Even under a Fichtean framework, where
the role of copyright is significantly diminished, a balance between
authors and users can be struck to promote the production of creative
goods. In other words, a moral rights basis for copyright can result in
achieving the same consequences that a utilitarian basis desires-
promoting the proliferation of more creative goods. Fichte's dichotomy
370. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 2010).
371. SALINGER, supra note 116.
372. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 71.
373. Id. at 83.
374. Id.
375. Andrew Albanese, J.D. Salinger Estate, Swedish Author Settle Copyright Suit,
PUBLISHER'S WKLY. (Jan. 11, 2011), https://www.publishersweekly.com/pwfby-topic/industry-
news/publisher-news/article/45738-j-d-salinger-estate-swedish-author-settle-copyright-suit.html
[https://perma.cc/7D35-CLYJ].
376. See, e.g., Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright
Philosophy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1306-07 (2003) (contrasting natural rights
rationales for copyright with the economic rationale, and emphasizing that the economic rationale
"allows for a balancing between the interests of the public in accessing the good and the right of
the author to receive an economic reward").
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possessed an inherent balancing mechanism that carved out space for
the secondary use of creative goods, although this was not his direct
concern.
This is not to say that Fichte thought there should be anarchy.
His conception of copyright still prohibited piracy,377 which was
Goethe's real concern.378 Although an implication of applying Fichte's
views is that character appropriation should not be regulated by
copyright, it does not follow that character appropriation should not be
regulated by law at all. Fichte's discussion of providing fair
compensation to the inventors of ideas suggest that the law should still
step in to make sure that character appropriation is done fairly.37 9
VI. TOWARDS NEW WAYS OF SEEING
It would be unrealistic to attempt to transplant a Fichtean
perspective of fictional character ownership into US copyright law.
Amongst many other hurdles, constitutional reform would be required
to replace copyright's current utilitarian rationale with Fichte's natural
law rationale.380 Although the Goethe-Nicolai case study suggests that
applying a Fichtean perspective to issues of character appropriation
may help more art to be produced, one case study is not enough to prove
such a significant proposition. An extensive amount of research and
analysis would need to be undertaken to weigh the benefits and costs of
implementing a Fichtean system of copyright in the United States.
Furthermore, although examining a Fichtean perspective also
supports arguments concluding that fictional character ownership is
theoretically untenable and undesirable,381 abolition of such ownership
also seems unrealistic given the Ninth Circuit's recent affirmation of
fictional character ownership in Towle.3 82 What may be more realistic
is to exhort the judiciary to clarify the language used in discussing
fictional character ownership. Instead of holding that characters
themselves can be copyrightable, judges should more explicitly hold
that only expressions of characters are copyrightable. It is easier to
377. See supra Section III.C.2.
378. See supra Section V.C.
379. See supra Section III.C.1.
380. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
381. See, e.g., Francis M. Nevins, Jr., Copyright + Character = Catastrophe, 39 J.
COPYRIGHT SoC'Y U.S.A. 303, 343 (1992) ("[I]t is impossible to articulate a criterion for separating
copyrightable from uncopyrightable characterizations that does not compel courts to operate ultra
vires and hand down aesthetic decisions."); see also Said, supra note 29, at 827 ("Outside the text,
in the minds of their readers, characters should not be independently copyrightable because, in a
very real sense, they fail to satisfy copyright's fixation requirement once they have been removed
from their texts.").
382. DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th Cir. 2015).
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reconcile this language shift with existing jurisprudence, and it can also
motivate a more detailed factual analysis when copyright infringement
suits arise.
Hence, judges will still have to grapple with which of the three
character copyrightability tests to apply in a relevant case. However,
the goal of each test ought not to be about discerning whether a
character is copyrightable, but whether the work or set of works that
express the plaintiffs ideas of the character amount to copyrightable
expression. If the sufficiently delineated test is applied, either on its
own or as a part of Towle's three-part test, the test should not be applied
to a character (i.e., is the character sufficiently delineated) but to the
parts of the plaintiffs works that express that character (i.e., whether
the works in question sufficiently delineate the character).383 Applying
this test to the facts of Towle, such works would be the parts of DC
Comics' Batman comics, television series, and films that have expressed
the idea of the Batmobile in some way.3 8 4 This provides a more definite
boundary for the scope of copyright subsisting in the expressions of the
Batmobile. Instead of utilizing generalized descriptions of the
Batmobile, the court is continuously motivated to refer back to the
concrete conglomerate of comic book panels, television, and film shots
that make up the expression of the Batmobile.385
The more concrete the analysis at the character copyrightability
assessment stage, the greater the clarity of the analysis for copyright
infringement. Instead of comparing a generalized description of the
plaintiffs character to another generalized description of the
defendant's character, the court should be motivated to compare specific
parts of the plaintiffs works that express the allegedly infringed
character to the specific parts of the defendant's works that express the
allegedly infringing character.386 Although adopting this language shift
does not solve the great incoherence underlying the character
copyrightability test, such a move motivates more thoughtful analysis
in character appropriation cases.
Thoughtful analysis is one of the fruits of considering a
philosophical perspective and applying it to legal problems. However,
philosophical or legal thinking alone can only go so far. Cross-
383. See id. at 1021.
384. See id.
385. See id.
386. This Article's exhortation resonates with Kurtz' similar exhortation for courts to
refocus their legal analysis. Kurtz, supra note 29, at 523 ("Comparing specific traits and the way
in which they are combined provides a way to analyze the characters in a concrete fashion and
elucidate their development. Without such comparison, courts tend to engage in abstract




disciplinary research and analysis is important. A fair amount of ink
has been spilled on fictional characters from both a philosophical
perspective387 and a legal perspective.388 Ironically, the philosophical
discussion may have missed the legal discipline's problem-solving focus;
whereas the legal discussion may have missed the philosophical
"factual" analysis that would provide greater depth to the legal
discussion.
VII. CONCLUSION
Applying a Fichtean perspective to fictional characters provides
a broader, more grounded outlook on the ownership of fictional
characters. Such a perspective provides a more coherent framework for
how to better express and navigate the nuanced relationships between
authors, secondary authors, and characters. It views fictional
characters as ideas, unownable by all of the world, barring their
expressions, which are exclusively owned by authors.389 This opens up
a means of safeguarding and validating each and every person's unique
interpretation of a fictional character. No single person will have a
definitive interpretation of what a fictional character means.
Conceiving fictional characters as ideas is crucial to this state of
affairs.390
Applying a Fichtean perspective also allows fictional characters
a meaningful sort of independence from their creators and those who
engage with them. Fascinatingly, one commentator has suggested that
less explicit copyright protection for fictional characters contributes to
seeing fictional characters as "second-class citizens in the world of
intellectual property."391 Using the term "citizen" is ironic because it
suggests according a greater dignity to a fictional character the more
that character is made a subject of property-property referring to a
character's vulnerability to being owned by another and being
commercially exploited, much like a slave or bondservant. In contrast,
387. For a contemporary review of the discourse, see Fred Kroon & Alberto Voltolini,
Fiction, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2016),
https://plato.stanford.edularchives/win2016/entries/fiction [https://perma.cc/93WG-R7KPI (last
visited Sept. 18, 2018). Note that the Fichtean perspective outlined here does not neatly align to
any existing philosophical accounts, although it has many similarities to fictional realism.
388. See, e.g., supra note 29 and accompanying text.
389. See supra Section W.A.
390. See Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use, 55 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 93, 101 (1992) ("Too broad a set of intellectual property rights can give one set of persons
control over how that reality is viewed, perceived, interpreted-control over what the world
means.").
391. David B. Feldman, Finding a Home for Fictional Characters: A Proposal for Change
in Copyright Protection, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 687, 687 (1990).
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a Fichtean view makes characters less the subjects of property and
more personas in their own "right."392 They are owned by no man nor
woman. They are free. In this sense, characters are beyond copyright.
392. Perhaps seeing characters in this way may make us open to even giving characters
"rights." Authors could possibly be seen as the guardians of characters, as opposed to their owners.
As Patricia Williams has famously encouraged on the topic of rights-giving, "Instead, society must
give [rights] away . . . . Give to all of society's objects and untouchables the rights of privacy,
integrity, and self-assertion; give them distance and respect." PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 165 (1991) (emphasis in original).
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